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Abstract 
In many African countries, including Ethiopia, decades of ruthless dictatorships 
and civil war, were followed by an almost universal demand for democracy combined 
with a seemingly willing leadership. However, two decades since this significant upsurge 
to adopt democratic governance, many are left wondering about the depth of commitment 
to this effort and the sincerity of political leaders. In fact, many dictators and autocrats 
have adopted the language of democracy and some of its formal elements. Academics, 
donor countries, and  international organizations are struggling to identify an appropriate 
model of governance. 
The theory of semi-authoritarianism strives to address this issue of ambiguity by 
placing the responsibility for democratization, or the lack thereof, with the political 
leadership. The argument here is that many countries seemingly in transition are not. 
Rather, they are semi-authoritarian by design as the political elite has a vested interest in 
preventing democratic consolidation. The theory of semi-authoritarianism attempts to 
explain the continuation of false democracies. However, the theory is too broad and 
superficial, it raises just as many questions as it attempts to address. The attempt to 
classify and explain emerging political trends in countries such as Ethiopia without an 
appreciation of deeper forces beyond elite manipulation can jeopardize a realistic 
appraisal of the fate of democracy.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
SEMI-AUTHORITARIANISM: A CASE STUDY OF 
ETHIOPIA 
 
 
Research is to see what everybody else has seen,  
and think what nobody else has thought. 
 
~Albert Szent Györgyi~ 
 
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War in the 1990s brought about a “wind of change” in 
international relations. It became increasingly evident that the East could no longer bail 
out dictatorships with socialist agendas, while the West would refrain from its previous 
policies of extending support to corrupt, anti-communist regimes. Dictatorships collapsed 
like dominoes. While rejoicing in the superiority of liberal democracy over socialism, due 
to the new world system where the United States became the sole hegemon and liberal 
democracy the driving ideological imperative, the international community failed to fully 
assess the early challenges of democratization faced by many African countries like 
Ethiopia. As Jane Perlez suggested, 
Once avidly wooed by Washington and Moscow with large amounts of economic aid and 
modern armaments, the impoverished nations of Africa now find themselves desperate 
for friends. In the last three years, superpower rivalry has been replaced by international 
indifference […] Ethiopia and Somalia, which were at the center of the tussle for 
influence on the African continent in the 1970‟s, now lie devastated, orphans of the post-
cold-war era.
1
 
 
  After a decade of civil strife against dictatorship, by 1991 there was an almost 
universal demand for democracy in Ethiopia. Civilians were disillusioned with past 
                                                        
1
 Jane Perlez, “After the Cold War: Views From Africa; Stranded by Superpowers, Africa Seeks an 
Identity”, in: The New York Times. 17 May 1992 
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authoritarian regimes and demanded greater civil liberties. At the same time, there was a 
top down movement on the part of intellectuals, educators, and social and religious 
leaders who advocated the establishment of democratic institutions and an opening for 
political participation.
2
 However, partly due to an upsurge of democratic euphoria, little 
attention was paid to the reality of a democratic transition by heavily aid dependent 
African countries. Democratization was taken for granted without an in-depth assessment 
of the nature of artificially constructed states formed under imperialist expansion and 
colonial rule, and further held together by Cold War induced centralized government 
control. 
Under the circumstances, most African governments, including Ethiopia, had to 
confront the difficult task of maintaining national unity given its multiethnic and 
culturally diverse citizenry. At the same time, the state was confronted with the challenge 
of ruling with the legacy of single ethnic dominance and authoritarian tendencies.
3
 
 
Thesis of Study 
 Today, academics and policy advisers have the difficult task of researching and 
assessing the flawed democratization that emerged in Ethiopia from a celebrated political 
opening in 1991 to the present. Like most authoritarian states, Ethiopia suggested a 
political opening was emerging along with the establishment of democratic institutions 
and democratic procedures. However, the democratic institutions and procedures were 
subject to limitations and significant top down control. Ethiopia continues in a state of 
                                                        
2
 Krishna Kumar and Jereon de Zeeuw, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies”, in: Krishna 
Kumar and Jereon de Zeeuw (eds.). Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies, Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner. 2006. 5. 
3
 Earl Conteh-Morgan, Democratization in Africa: The Theory and Dynamics of Political Transitions, New 
York: Praeger. 1997. 95 
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democratic deficit, a state that some academics such as Marina Ottaway argue is 
facilitated by a governing elite addicted to the rhetoric of democracy, but which 
essentially is semi-authoritarian by design. It is crucial though to go beyond the 
contribution of the governing elite to Ethiopia‟s democratic deficit. Critically, we are 
dealing with more than semi-authoritarianism by design by a determined and self-
interested elite. In essence, and the central thesis of this study, semi-authoritarianism is 
more than a system of governance based on elite will, by design, but as well it arises by 
default, as a consequence of the country‟s past structures of governance. In other words, 
Marina Ottaway, and other academics that are more taken by democratization, miss a 
critical point, semi-authoritarianism is built on a past history of dominance, the only form 
of governance, which seemed suited to a country driven by ethnic fragmentation and 
rivalry. The objective of the thesis is to flesh out this critical divergence from accepted 
political analysis. 
 In terms of Ethiopia, its emperors based their claims to govern, on the theory of a 
divine right of kings, which entitled them to rule by a will higher than that of society.
4
 
But, as the modern state replaced the imperial structures, state-building ideologies 
clashed with ethnic aspirations. The last two regimes in power – the Derg under Mariam 
Mengistu, and the EPRDF under Meles Zenawi – have attempted to manage Ethiopia‟s 
over eighty distinct ethno-linguistic groups
5
 by two radically different approaches to state 
building.
6
 Mengistu based “his authority on a legal function that proclaims that the people 
                                                        
4
 Amare Tekle, “Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Politics”, in: Marina Ottaway (ed.) The Political 
Economy of Ethiopia, New York: Praeger. 1990. 37 
5
 Edmond J. Keller, “Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and Democracy in Ethiopia”, in: 
African Journal of Political Science, Volume 7 Number 1. 2002. 21 
6
 Jannie Malan, “Conflict Resolution: Wisdom from Africa”, report from: The African Centre for 
Constructive Resolution of Disputes. 50 
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have willed the creation of a socialist society of which his „Marxist-Leninist‟ party is the 
sole architect and through which he becomes sole representative and supreme guide”.7 On 
the other hand, the current party in power, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), has established a governing system based on ethnic 
federalism creating a new system of regional governments. However, the Zenawi regime 
has failed to relinquish central control and implement appropriate power sharing 
measures.  In both recent regimes, ethnic aspirations for power developed into ethnic 
rivalry. Ethnic awareness intensified based on underlying tensions due to historic 
grievances, feelings of political and developmental disadvantage in comparison to other 
ethnic groups and fundamentally, the threat of losing one‟s cultural identity. What we 
have then is a past and current political leaders driven by ethnic calculations that see the 
only way to hold the fragmented State together is to turn to authoritarian patterns of rule. 
The elite both asserts ethnic dominance and, at the very same time, forces central 
dominance in order to maintain the State fabric. The cost then is fundamental - the 
common Ethiopian is merely a pawn in both a calculated and a forced pattern of 
dominance. 
 To put the central thesis in a clearer context, two points emerge from the 
Ethiopian experience. First, old and present regimes regard the individual as a subject 
with duties rather than citizens with defined, protected rights. These subjects do not 
possess the freedom to judge between right and wrong, political good and evil, justice 
and injustice, but have one sole purpose in society: to fulfill the wishes of the leaders.
8
 
Second, the cohesive elements of nationalism are lacking in large parts of the population. 
                                                        
7
 Tekle. 37 
8
 Ibid. 
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Within the Ethiopian political tradition, the term state, or the equivalent in Amharic, 
mengist,
9
 has slightly different connotations from a modern concept of a democratic state.  
Given Ethiopia‟s turbulent history, to its peoples, the term mengist carries a connotation 
of „imperial authority‟, sovereignty, divine legitimacy, nation building, and a form of 
state-nationalism anchored on central control and domination.
10
 In the case of Ethiopia, 
self-serving and very narrow ethnic leadership, combined with the lack of a pan-
Ethiopian identity and lacking a widely accepted legitimate, modern Ethiopian state leads 
to authoritarian rule.  
 
Methodology and Literature Review 
 The objective of this study is to answer the following question: Is Ethiopia semi-
authoritarian by design or default? In order to answer this question, qualitative research 
methods were applied to 119 sources of secondary data collected from academic journals 
in the field of study, books, reports, and the documentary Ethiopia: Betrayal of 
Democracy.  
 Since the early 1990‟s a considerable amount of research has been done on 
democratization and democratic institutions with limited functions in Africa. Some of the 
key authors that have published extensively in the field are Thomas Carothers, Larry 
Diamond, Staffan Lindberg, and Marina Ottaway. Carothers has been one the most 
influential authors who has pointed to the fallacy of the `transition paradigm‟. In his 2002 
article, The End of the Transition Paradigm, he argued that many African countries 
engage in a democratic „gray zone‟ between authoritarian and democratic rule adopting 
                                                        
9
 yvind Aadland, “Sera: Traditionalism or Living Democratic Values”, in: Bahru Zewde and Siegfried 
Pausewamg (eds.) Ethiopia: The Challenge of Democracy from Below, Nordic Africa Institute. 2002. 29 
10
 Ibid. 
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political forms such as feckless pluralism or one-party dominant polities.
11
 In other 
words, opposition political parties are short lived, plagued by divisions, engaged in 
unstable temporary alliances, and divided by acrimony.
12
 Also, despite democratic forms 
and processes, the political system is dominated by one party, ethnic group, or 
charismatic leader, in such a way that there seems to be little prospect for power 
alternation.
13
 In his 2007 article, The Sequencing Fallacy, Carothers further argues that 
democratization as well as open national elections are not necessarily universally 
accepted principles.
14
 In some cases, a democratic opening may lead to illiberal leaders, 
virulent nationalism, ethnic conflict, and internecine wars.
15
 He further argues that the 
rule of law and a functioning state should be strong preconditions to democratization.
16
 
 Larry Diamond was also critical of the form of democratization undertaken in 
Africa. In his book Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, he points out that five 
flawed assumptions lead to shallow electoral democracies in Africa. First, he makes the 
case that powerful Western democracies have pressed the democratization model on 
weaker states due to the growing belief that accountable political systems rooted in a 
strong constitution, will produce better governance and more legitimate stable states.
17
 
Second, the assumption that the establishment of social and political infrastructure such 
as legislatures, judicial systems, local governments, civil society organizations, political 
                                                        
11
Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, in: Journal of Democracy, Volume 13 Number 
1. January 2002. 10 
12
 Ibid. 11 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Thomas Carothers, “The „Sequencing‟ Fallacy”, in: Journal of Democracy, Volume 18 Number 1. 
January 2007. 12  
15
 Ibid. 13 
16
 Ibid. 
17
Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press. 1999. 56 
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parties, and elections will result in democratic consolidation is flawed.
18
 Three, Diamond 
criticizes the assumption that gradual political learning through a form of imitation of  
existing democracies could lead to consolidation.
19
 Four, he argues that judgments and 
assumptions at a global level of what is intrinsically good, right, and desirable, including 
the Western form of democracy, do not necessarily bring about democratization.
20
 And 
finally, he points out the fallacy of global standardization, by arguing that it leads to 
formal symbolic, and hollow as opposed to true democracies.
21
 
 Perhaps more than any academic, Staffan Lindberg places into perspective the 
ambiguity associated with democratic opening and democratic practices in Africa. In a 
2003 article, „It‟s Our Time to “Chop””: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-
Patrimonialism Rather Than Counteract It?‟, Lindberg reports on survey findings that 
democratization in Ghana has led to increased corruption through patron-client networks 
and that patronage politics is a viable threat to democratic consolidation.
22
 In 2006 
however, in the article, “The Surprising Significance of African Elections”, Lindberg 
argues that repeated elections in Africa can lead to democratic commitment, and “have a 
positive impact on human freedom and democratic values”.23 There is a stark 
contradiction between the two Lindberg perspectives. However, this contradiction points 
out the African dilemma. Democratic practices, such as elections for example take on 
completely different dimensions in countries such as Ghana. Yet without elections, from 
a Western point of view, liberal democracy is impossible. 
                                                        
18
 Ibid.  
19
 Ibid. 57 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 Ibid. 58 
22
 Staffan Lindberg, “ „It‟s Our Time to “Chop‟”: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather 
than Counteract it?”, in: Democratization, Volume 10 Number 2. Summer 2003. 121 
23
 Staffan Lindberg, “The Surprising Significance of African Elections”, in: Journal of Democracy, Volume 
17 Number 1. January 2006. 140 
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Ottaway builds on the democratization dialog by coining the term semi-
authoritarianism, which is discussed at length in the thesis. In her book, Democracy 
Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism, she looks at five case studies – Egypt, 
Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Senegal, and Croatia – to prove the point that democratic 
consolidation is prevented by political elites that have the ability to serve their interests in 
an authoritarian state more so than in a democratic one. Ottaway‟s theoretical guidelines 
are an important part of this thesis. In accordance with the thesis question, the theory of 
semi-authoritarianism was applied to the Ethiopian case study. The Ethiopian case was 
considered from two points of view, first current political trends were analyzed; second, 
significant importance was also attributed to the two political regimes that have preceded 
the current EPRDF government.  
 Ethiopia has a very complex structural, social, and ethnic composition. To gain an 
understanding, several sources were considered. Ethiopia: The Challenge of Democracy 
from Below, for example, published in 2002 includes essays from 13 authors discussing 
key issues such as: local governance, traditional governing institutions and democratic 
values, the relationship between the rural population and the central government, civil 
society, and democratization. The Political Economy of Ethiopia published in 1990, and 
edited by Marina Ottaway, is another good source of collected essays focusing mostly on 
continuity in political practices between the Monarchy and the Derg military regime, 
imperialism along with constitutional engineering and ethnic diversity, as well as 
revolution, potential national disintegration, development and the Ethiopian economy. 
Authors such as Jan Abbink looked at the nature of violence in Ethiopia. Edmond Keller 
analyzed the nature of the federalist state and power sharing between different levels of 
  9  
government, while authors such as Rene Lefort reported on the 2005 elections, and, 
Lovise Aalen applied the federalist framework to Ethiopia to determine the potential for 
disintegration. More recent studies worth mentioning were done by Asnake Kefale who 
looked at ethnic alliance formation and ethnic negotiations within the federalist structure 
and the work of Asafa Jalata who analyzed Clandestine Genocide in Ethiopia. 
This study is unique as it combines the theory of semi-authoritarianism with the 
Ethiopian case study where the current regime is not analyzed in isolation, but rather in 
the larger context of historic political patterns rooted in imperialism and centralization. It 
also builds in analysis of persisting nation building challenges. The study explores the 
nature, interrelationships and implications of key aspects of Ethiopian politics to 
determine if the country is semi-authoritarian by design according to Ottaway‟s 
classification. This study does not aim at proving or disproving the validity of semi-
authoritarianism as a theory. Research was also directed at current political, social and 
cultural trends that give strong indications on the surface that the current Ethiopian 
government consciously and willingly engages in semi-authoritarian practices. However, 
attention was also given to historic considerations of regime changes and the evolution of 
a political culture that sustains deference to authority and voicelessness on the part of 
ordinary Ethiopians. Hence, contrary to Ottaway‟s framework and indeed the 
assumptions of many Western and African academics, Ethiopia is semi-authoritarian by 
default as well as by design. Our analysis of the Ethiopian case throws open a fascinating 
insight into the failure of African countries to import the liberal-democratic model of 
politics. Instead of asking why has the liberal-democratic model failed, the thesis 
unravels the answer by asking why has semi-authoritarianism succeeded.  
  10  
Chapter Outlines 
 For the purposes of clarity, the study has been organized into three core chapters 
followed by a concluding chapter. Chapter Two, “The End of the Third Wave, The 
Fallacy of the Transition Paradigm and Semi-Authoritarianism”, presents an exploration 
of democratization trends adopted by the majority of countries deemed transitional since 
the “third wave of democratization”.24 The chapter will explore the extent of democratic 
openings experienced by most countries as well as governments‟ abilities to limit and 
cripple the functioning of adopted democratic institutions. Analysis will focus as well on 
the ambiguity associated with democracy, political liberalization and democratic 
consolidation. Chapter Two will also include an overview of efforts by the academic 
community to define the `democratic deficit‟, as well as introduce key concepts of semi-
authoritarianism developed by Marina Ottaway. Discussion will continue with an in in-
depth analysis of the current Ethiopian regime‟s approach to competitive politics as well 
as power transfer and power sharing. 
 Chapter Three, “A Close Look at Ethiopia‟s Turbulent Political and Ethnic 
History”, will build on the previous chapter. In order to test the theory of semi-
authoritarianism by design in the Ethiopian context, semi-authoritarianism by default 
must be addressed. The thesis will examine underlying conditions in Ethiopia with a 
special focus on the politics of ethnicity. This will be undertaken by examining Ethiopia‟s 
last three regimes - the Monarchy under Haile Selassie, the socialist Derg regime under 
                                                        
24
 The term was coined by Samuel P. Huntington in his book, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century, published in 1991. Huntington points out that over 60 countries in Europe, Latin 
America, Asia and Africa have embarked on a road of democratization in the 1990s. Since than, the catch-
phrase “the third wave” has been widely used by scholars analyzing democratic opening, democratic 
transition and democratic consolidation.  
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Mengistu Mariam, as well as the current EPRDF regime under Meles Zenawi. The 
Chapter will analyze the nature of change between different regimes, constitutional 
changes based on radically different ideological approaches, ethnic and regional re-
structuring, the polarization effect of ethno-nationalism and the emergence of an 
ethnically organized resistance against authoritarianism. The chapter will establish that 
Ethiopia‟s turbulent social, ethnic and political history has created overwhelming 
structural impediments to democratization.  
Chapter Four, “Semi-Authoritarianism and Ethnic Violence” brings coherence to 
the thesis. In the Ethiopian context, analysis and discussion will point to the underlying 
themes of African politics such as Dependency Theory, lack of nation unity and the threat 
of „national‟ disintegration along ethnic lines. Analysis will also propose skepticism in 
allowing multi-party competition in a zero-sum game political environment as well as the 
critical behavior of political elites anchored in neo-patrimonialism and ethnic 
competition.  
 Chapter Five, “Semi-Authoritarianism by Design and Default: Two Sides of the 
Same Coin”, aims at tying together loose ends and affords a final analysis. In more 
abstract terms, semi-authoritarian political structures can be interpreted in relation to 
Abraham Lincoln‟s famous 1858 speech. When accepting the republican nomination for 
U.S. Senate from Illinois, Abraham Lincoln warned that “a government cannot endure 
permanently half slave and half free […] it will become all one thing or all the other”. At 
this crucial point in history, Lincoln was alluding to the division over the issue of slavery, 
an issue that posed a viable threat to the Union of States. Lincoln‟s timeless observation 
is perhaps as viable today as it was in the 1800‟s. What will be the ultimate outcome of 
  12  
the relationship between democratic principles and authoritarian traditions is hard to 
predict. It is clear however that we need to rethink the dissonance between democracy 
promotion on the part of the Western governments and international institutions and the 
African reality.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE END OF THE THIRD WAVE, THE FALLACY OF 
THE TRANSITION PARADIGM AND SEMI-
AUTHORITARIANISM 
 
 
The basis of the democratic state is liberty. 
~Aristotle, The Politics~ 
 
Introduction 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
communist states of Eastern Europe, both international and domestic pressures arose for a 
quantum shift towards the democratic alternative in developing countries. Thirty-seven of 
forty-eight Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries moved to adopt more open political 
systems. Part of this shift could be traced to the increasing popular disquiet with the 
repressive and autocratic regimes of the South. An extensive literature emerged on the 
process of `re-democratization‟ including two new academic journals devoted exclusively 
to the democratic wave that seemed to be sweeping across the countries of the South. One 
influential academic study by Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle suggested that 
the wave would come in three distinct stages – first, political protest, second, political 
liberalization, and, ultimately, democratic consolidation.
25
 The degree of external and 
internal pressures for reform seemed inexorable and many academics, international 
officials, donor agencies and non-governmental organizations joined the chorus of 
`democracy promoters‟.    
 
                                                        
25
 Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in 
Comparative Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1999 
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However, the days of optimism only prevailed in the 1990s. With the new 
millennium it became obvious that the political opening and democratic wave had stalled. 
Some though insisted that the re-democratization of formerly illiberal developing 
countries would take time and require deeper reforms than merely adhering to political 
liberalization. Hence, new pressures appeared for constitutional reform and the turn to 
`good governance‟ and its package of initiatives, which would run far deeper in 
reforming the political system. To these remaining optimists, developing countries were 
in a period of transition on the way to democratic consolidation. 
An influential democracy analyst, Thomas Carothers suggested otherwise 
challenging several of the core assumptions of the optimistic, pro-transition school. The 
establishment of superficial stability and insincere, artificial democracies prompted many 
academic experts and policy advisors to lose faith in the prospects of democratic 
consolidation in the third world. Most experts no longer hesitate to proclaim the end of 
the third wave, and point out the fallacy of the `Transition Paradigm‟. Democracy 
promotion is experiencing serious doubt while alternative perspectives fusing democracy 
and despotism are on the rise. In effect, “fin –de-siècle optimism has given way to early-
twenty-first-century gloom”,26 as authoritarianism cloaked in democratic disguise gains 
more and more ground in most of the third world, and honest democratic efforts are 
further and further scarce.  
 
Democracy and Democratic Consolidation 
                                                        
 
26
 Nicholas van de Walle, “Elections Without Democracy: Africa‟s Range of Regimes”, in: Journal of 
Democracy, Volume 13 Number 2. April 2002. 66 
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Democracy defined by ancient Greek philosophers as “rule by the people” is 
perhaps the most complex form of government.  Modern democracy was not formulated 
until the Age of Enlightenment when philosophers established the separation of powers, 
basic civil rights, religious liberty, and the separation of church and state as the four 
pillars of democracy. A modern definition establishes democracy as a “form of 
government, where a constitution guarantees basic personal and political rights, fair and 
free elections, and independent courts of law”.27 This definition is less than helpful when 
considering democracy in developing countries. The problem arises from the reluctance 
of governments in the South to fully adhere to these constitutional guarantees. 
 With the end of the Cold War, democracy has been increasingly promoted as the 
only acceptable governing system. However, the number of well-established democracies 
is relatively small. Studies of democratization vary widely in their approaches as well as 
methodologies. We have a good understanding of how democracies function but not how 
they emerge.
28
 As Thomas Carothers argued, “Democracy promotion can no longer 
assume a consensus about the preeminence of democracy among the main geostatic 
actors in the world. It has to return to the challenge of engaging in global debates over the 
very value of democracy itself”.29 Considerations such as the universality of democracy 
or its feasible application in culturally, ethnically, economically and historically diverse 
societies have left modern academics not just with the question of whether democracy is 
present in a certain political community but also with the challenges of assessing its 
quality and depth.  
                                                        
27
 “Democracy Building”. http://www.democracy-building.info/index.html August 2009. 
28
 Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism, Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 2003. 11 
29
 Thomas Carothers, “A Quarter-Century of Promoting Democracy”, in: Journal of Democracy, Volume 
18 Number 4. October 2007. 115 
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The Democratic Deficit Problem 
Larry Diamond and Leonardo Molino argue that at a minimum democracy 
requires universal adult suffrage, recurring free, competitive and fair elections, more than 
one serious political party and alternative sources of media.
30
 Based on these criteria the 
quality of democracy can be assessed through procedure, content and result. Through 
procedure, they highlight the importance of rule of law, participation, competition, and 
vertical and horizontal accountability. Content encompasses freedom and equality while 
the result is responsiveness, in other words, citizen demand and preferences as aggregated 
through the political process.
31
 Diamond and Molino point out that, 
In one sense, we can speak of different „qualities‟ of democracy, and assess the level of 
development of each one individually […] although it is possible to identify different 
types of lower quality democracy, which are deficient in different qualities, the various 
dimensions are closely linked and tend to move together, either toward democratic 
improvement and deepening or toward decay.
32
 
 
Although the argument presented by Diamond and Molino is compelling, it fails 
to provide guidelines for classifying “lower quality democracy”. Their contributions also 
prove insufficient when distinguishing between countries that are trying to adopt the 
democratic model but failing, as against countries that are making only a pretense of 
trying.  
 
The End of the Transition Paradigm 
 Increasingly, critical academic research challenged the assumed linear path to 
democratic consolidation suggesting the transition phase was unhelpful and 
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fundamentally misleading. Essentially it is based on false hope rather than realistic 
analysis. The most ardent critic of the Transition Paradigm, Thomas Carothers points out 
that it is no longer appropriate to assume that,  
 Most countries that adopted a degree of liberalization in the early 1990s are in 
transition towards democracy 
 Countries moving away from authoritarianism follow the Transition Paradigm 
 Elections will ultimately lead to democratic consolidation 
 Successful democratization depends primarily on intentions and actions of the 
political elite without “significant influence from underlying economic, social 
and institutional conditions and legacies”33 
 State building is secondary to democratic establishment 
Carothers drew on statistical data to point out that only about twenty out of a hundred 
`transitional‟ countries are making any progress towards democracy34 while the rest are 
neither dictatorial nor democratic. He argued that, “the Transition Paradigm has been 
somewhat useful during a time of momentous and often surprising political upheaval in 
the world”.35 However, most countries deemed transitional are not following the 
transition model; on the contrary, it is clear that they foster authoritarian practices. 
 
Semi-authoritarianism Defined 
Given Carothers devastating critique then how do we classify those developing 
countries locked in what we now know is a `non-transition‟ stasis. Marina Ottaway, a 
prominent academic in the field of democracy and post-conflict reconstruction politics, 
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built on Carothers‟ argument and developed the theory of `semi-authoritarianism‟ to 
describe this regime type. She makes the case that regimes that cannot be easily classified 
as either authoritarian or democratic, but display some characteristics of both, are semi-
authoritarian.
36
 Ottaway addressed head on the problem of classifying these countries as 
transitional by claiming that, 
they are ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the 
existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil 
and political liberties with essentially liberal and authoritarian traits […] Semi-
authoritarian systems are not imperfect democracies struggling toward improvement and 
consolidation but regimes determined to maintain the appearance of democracy without 
exposing themselves to the political risks that free competition entails.
37
 
 
Political and Structural Factors of Semi-Authoritarianism 
Semi-authoritarian regimes are thus one outcome of more than a decade of efforts 
to promote democracy by the international community
38
 and revitalized civil society in 
developing countries. One clear benefit of the re-democratization movement though is 
that the military in the third world
39
 has become increasingly reluctant to seize power due 
to a massive lack of support for the coup d‟état. Even in countries where democratic 
reforms have stalled, the public has shown a degree of resistance to a return to complete 
authoritarian rule.
40
 In essence then, democracy has been hollowed out and “most 
constitutional regimes of the third wave appear „condemned to remain democratic‟ only 
in form”.41 
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Ottaway suggests that semi-authoritarian regimes engage in the politics of 
“survival, not consolidation”.42 First, they limit the transfer of power through patronage 
by co-opting opposition elements. Second, stability is based on the leadership of a small 
elite group rather than the weak institutions that are set up to appease the international 
community. Third, the political opening has not deepened economic reform. At the same 
time, the lack of separation between political and economic elites
43
 has created a deeply 
entrenched ruling class unwilling to allow free, open and equal political competition.  
Finally, such regimes implement restrictive registration laws as well as overt and covert 
pressures to limit the scope of civil society organizations (CSOs), which are seen as 
potentially threatening to the ruling class. Civil society contributes to social pluralism but 
would not be allowed to promote political power sharing
44
 and reflects old social 
divisions. Ottaway argues that these social divisions are sustained through carefully 
orchestrated and refined power structures, free-floating elites and transition fatigue. 
 
Asymmetrical Power Sharing 
The political elite engages deliberately in corrupt practices to limit the power of 
democratic actors and disadvantage opposition parties in generating support. Ruling 
parties resort to manipulation, coercion and even open violence to further their 
dominance while the opposition parties‟ only hope, and a faint one at that, is to win 
flawed elections. Opposition parties are marginalized with few resources to mount 
serious challenges to ruling parties which have unlimited access to State resources for 
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campaign purposes. Furthermore, power is rarely generated through political institutions, 
“leaders are elected, but their power is rooted elsewhere”.45 As Ottaway suggests, 
Semi-authoritarian leaders […] do their best to manipulate elections, but this is only part 
of the problem, and not the most important one, namely the conundrum of how to 
transfer, through the democratic process, power that is not derived from the popular will 
and that resides in individuals rather than in institutions. If power resides in a particular 
president, rather than in the institution of the presidency, it cannot be transferred to 
others.
46
 
 
Free-Floating Elites 
Transitions to a successful democratic outcome are difficult given that aspiring 
political leaders engage in shifting alliances designed only to suit their narrow self-
interests for accumulation. In semi-authoritarian regimes, the political elites are not 
embedded, nor do they have a clear political program or ideological message. Some 
authoritarian leaders did manage to establish at least an emotional link with their 
constituents through popular or nationalistic rhetoric, but in most cases, political elites 
regardless whether in power or part of the opposition, merely pay lip service to 
democratic values.
47
 Ottaway also points out that sincere advocates of democracy have 
little connection to the population. In many cases, they are tied more to an “international 
milieu of democracy advocates than to the society they are trying to reform”.48 The free-
floating nature of these political elites is evident in the idealized view of democracy they 
embrace. “They portray democracy as a combination of abstract principles, formal 
political processes and highly technical reforms”.49 
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 The international community has contributed to this abstract view of democracy 
by imposing numerous conditionalities, by removing from discussion some of the most 
important policy issues confronting countries in transition and by supporting free floating 
elites by sponsoring civil society organizations that depend on foreign aid rather than on 
the mobilization of strong domestic stakeholders. At the same time, abstract democratic 
ideals do not have mass appeal unless they are coupled with other more tangible 
benefits.
50
 In the end, democracy and democratic principles have little relevance to the 
people they are meant to serve. Semi-authoritarianism is sustained by a lack of popular 
confidence in the superiority of democracy as a valued means of achieving worthwhile 
goals and as an instrument to protect and further people‟s democratic rights and interests. 
 
Transition Fatigue 
Semi-authoritarian leaders create conditions that make democratic progress and 
hence consolidation difficult. This means that political conditions are ambiguous. They 
are not democratic but neither are they authoritarian. The conditions that under normal 
circumstances would foster democratic growth are limited but not limited enough to elicit 
violent reaction. Ordinary citizens are burdened by what Ottaway terms as `transition 
fatigue‟ and, not surprisingly, disillusioned by the democratic experiment that has 
attenuated, they now show more concern for economic grievances than political ones. 
 
Semi-Authoritarianism by Design 
Thus, Marina Ottaway‟s major contribution is to suggest that semi-authoritarian 
regimes are not in transition or failed democracies, but rather “carefully constructed and 
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maintained alternative systems”.51 In other words, most countries considered 
„transitional‟ are semi-authoritarian by design and the political elite have a vested interest 
in disallowing further liberalization. Those in power have mastered the political game and 
effectively balance international pressures for democratic consolidation with the 
challenges of competitive politics and the „problem‟ of power transfer. 
Ottaway argues that in semi-authoritarian states, the political elites are excellent at 
manipulating elections, winning voter‟s support, and flaunting endless campaign 
finance.
52
 Flawed elections are usually engineered carefully. The ruling party takes 
advantage of favorable periods or national holidays to time elections. In addition to 
adopting tactics of intimidation and violence, the government also tampers with voter 
registration, abuses safeguards against voter registries, introduces overly stringent 
registration procedures, refuses to issue identification documents to ethnic minorities and 
discriminates against émigrés.
53
 Opposition supporters are usually prevented from 
participating in elections, and districts that favor or vote for the opposition, receive little 
development funding. A proportionately decreased number of polling stations in 
opposition areas forces voters to travel great distances, or to wait for hours in barely 
moving lines only to find that the polling station has closed before their turn has come.
54
 
 Ruling parties have the ability to set up Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) to access donor support, reach different segments of society, and establish 
control over the population. They effectively engage in „Big Man‟ politics,55 where 
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personal relationships take precedence over formal rules and the leader‟s personal 
decisions carry more weight than the laws that those decisions might contradict.
56
 
Accordingly, power is maintained through the personal charisma of leaders, patronage 
and taking advantage of the populations‟ fears of instability and change. The governing 
elite successfully delegitimizes competitive politics by taking advantage of the state 
treasury to finance political campaigns and allocate government funds not only for 
patronage purposes but also for self-enrichment. Corruption helps consolidate their hold 
on power. Incumbent governments allow political challengers to run for office, but the 
ruling class remains confident that their „safeguards‟ will prevent an alternation in power. 
The result is an entrenched political class able to repress, manipulate or coopt challengers  
in a system designed to keep the opposition off-guard and constantly in disarray.
57
 
 
Semi-Authoritarianism and the Case of Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is a classic example of semi-authoritarianism. In 1991, due to the initial 
enthusiasm to follow the democratization trend, little attention was paid to the depth of 
the transition. In the government‟s attempt to gain popularity as well as international 
acceptance, key elements of democracy appeared the new constitution drafted in 1995. 
Accordingly an ethnically diverse coalition government fostered the signs of national 
integration and multi-party elections were introduced. An independent media was 
encouraged and civil society organizations received support. In spite of this, the political 
atmosphere did not foster democratic consolidation. The political elite soon reverted to 
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less than democratic methods of governing and feigned attention to “bottom-up or 
grassroots activities such as teaching people how to participate in the democratic process, 
or adapting indigenous democratic procedures and attitudes to modern requirements”.58 A 
substantial democratic deficit became evident. 
 
Dealing with the Challenges of Competitive Politics 
The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) was established in 1991. With its 
commitment to human and civil rights, its initial mandate was to end Ethiopia‟s violent 
history, mend ethnic divisions and establish a democratic government. The TGE‟s 
commitment to tolerance, peaceful assembly, freedom of association and the right to 
engage in unrestricted political activity quickly evaporated as opposition parties began to 
emerge. The government‟s increasingly authoritarian policies became more apparent as 
the date for regional and local elections approached. Therefore, throughout 1992 and 
1993 the TGE used social and economic restrictions, existing statutes, and outright 
harassment against those critical of policy recommendations by the Ethiopian People‟s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the dominant political party.
59
 As Makau wa 
Mutua pointed out early on in 1993, 
The first main sign that the EPRDF does not intend to compete politically for power with 
its rivals came during the 1992 elections. EPRDF security and armed forces, which also 
serve as government forces, engaged in the widespread harassment, intimidation and 
arrest of non-EPRDF political actors and individuals […] since the election, the TGE has 
become increasingly intolerant of dissent.
60
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The government‟s insincere commitment to democracy reignited tribal mistrust and 
strengthened ethnic fragmentation. Paranoid of Amharan supremacy,
61
 the government 
viewed the All Amhara People‟s Organization (AAPO), along with the Oromo Liberation 
Front (OLF)
62
 as major threats, and party officials as well as supporters were subjected to 
frequent harassment. The OLF decided to leave the EPRDF coalition while the newly 
constituted second coalition was further narrowed in 1993 when the TGE government 
ousted five political groups known as the Southern Coalition for endorsing a resolution 
adopted at the conference of opposition groups in Paris calling for the dissolution of the 
ruling council.
63
 Due to increased international pressure, in December 1993, the 
government allowed a “peace and reconciliation conference” organized by internal as 
well as exiled groups. However, in a continuing pattern opposition leadership was 
harassed, some of whom were detained and only released after the conclusion of the 
conference.  
During the 2005 elections, 36 political parties registered to compete but the 
EPRDF once again won a majority of seats. To regular Ethiopians, who perhaps for the 
first time in their lives were able to cast a vote, the election was “a heavy burden fraught 
with dangers”.64 The general perception of voters, most of them farmers, was that despite 
which party would be victorious, those who cast their vote in a „disloyal‟ manner would 
be penalized by restricted access to their means of production by the government. The 
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ruling regime had a near total monopoly on credit inputs such as fertilizers and select 
seeds.
65
 Therefore, the major occupation of voters was to guesstimate which party would 
win a majority so that they could express their political wish in accordance.
66
 The 
accepted attitude became that it was better “to delegate-decision making to authorities 
than to take any initiative”.67 
For the most part, the government was to blame for the general attitude adopted 
by most of the voting population. Unlike the general elections of 1995 and 2000 where 
the opposition was restricted to the point where it was marginal or nonexistent, the 
EPRDF decided that it would allow the 2005 elections to be free, fair and competitive. 
The underlying assumption was that the opposition was unorganized, inexperienced, 
divided and small. As a result, the EPRDF expected a landslide victory.
68
 However, the 
government overestimated its own popularity. “Despite being the power in place the party 
never gained the popular support, in part because it was perceived as anchored in the 
peripheral Tigreyan minority”.69  
In mid-April, one month before the elections, the party made drastic policy 
changes. It undertook major efforts to mobilize material as well as human resources while 
the security forces openly abandoned their “semblance of neutrality”.70 The EPRDF also 
proceeded to resort to coercion by exerting direct pressure on individuals. According to 
Lefort‟s research, Ethiopians reported that, 
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Two persons, generally one militia member and one cadre or a sub-kebele
71
 official, 
would walk door to door to ask people to sign a register committing them to vote for the 
EPRDF. If not, they would face „the consequences‟ after the elections, which could go as 
far as „forbidding us to go on living here‟.
72
 
 
Most people who signed the register clearly felt compelled to vote for the EPRDF. This 
was due in part to the government‟s decision to resort to a show of force as well as to 
rumors that the ballot was not secret. After all, the widespread perception was that the 
government had ways to find out who voted for whom. 
 On Election Day, the outcome of the ballot was uncertain for “people would cast 
their ballot in a manner contrary to the rationality on which democratic voting is 
supposed to be founded, but that is entirely rational on their own context”.73 According to 
Lefort, voters waited until last minute to find out who their fellow citizens voted for in 
order to better anticipate the winning party and cast their ballot accordingly. Some went 
even as far as to hope that the ballot was not secret in order to view how those who went 
before voted while others intentionally spoiled their ballots or abstained from voting 
altogether.
74
  
Furthermore, not all who wanted to observe or study the elections were granted 
access by the government. In late March 2005, the government became increasingly 
restrictive. It accused three USAID-funded organizations in Ethiopian to observe and 
monitor the election to leave the country on the grounds that they had not applied as 
NGOs.
75
 Shortly after, a senior European Union Observer, Dr. Siegfried Pausewang, 
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“withdrew and left the country after the government claimed he would not be objective 
on account of his criticism of the democratization process and the human rights situation 
in the country in an academic article”.76 Amnesty International also reported widespread 
human rights violations in the country featuring prolonged detention without charge or 
trial of members of opposition groups; torture of political prisoners; „disappearances‟ of 
journalists and government opponents; extrajudicial execution of civilians; and inter-
communal conflict or military opposition against armed opposition groups.
77
 
 
Preventing Power Transfer and Power Sharing 
Manipulating electoral results is not the only means by which the current 
government seeks to prevent a transfer of power. There is evidence to indicate that the 
EPRDF coalition is asserting an increasingly vigorous Tigreyan dominance. At the same 
time, the EPRDF facilitated ethnic fragmentation to prevent power sharing. Initially, the 
EPRDF was confronted with two primary challenges. First, in the midst of post-liberation 
movement turbulence, it had to keep control over the country, and second prepare the 
ground for democracy. To address these challenges, despite little experience with 
federalism and decentralized administration, the EPRDF opted to introduce what is 
termed „ethnic federalism‟ into Ethiopian politics. 
From a theoretical perspective, decentralization has become an essential political agenda 
to provide opportunities for people at the local level to be involved in determining their 
economic and political choices. Over the years, politicians and development policy 
makers have argued that decentralization is necessary to empower local communities to 
be responsible for their development […] decentralization is directly associated with 
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good governance, including consensual decision making, equity, representation, 
accountability and responsiveness of public institutions to community concerns.
78
 
 
In accordance with the new federalist form of government, jurisdiction was 
constitutionally apportioned between central and regional governments. Both federal and 
regional governments were accorded legislative, executive and judicial functions, while 
national defense, foreign policy, currency, inter-regional trade, and citizenship were 
established as major functions of the federal institutional power. Regional governments in 
turn were in charge of establishing economic and social development policies and 
strategies, managing a regional police force, and maintaining public order. The new 
federal structure became known as ethnic federalism, because ethnicity and language 
became the main factors in zonal divisions. In principle, the main objective of Ethiopia‟s 
regionalization was to enable the different ethnic groups to develop their culture and 
language, manage socio-economic development in their respective areas, exercise self 
rule and bring about an equitable share of national resources among the regions.
79
 
The failure of the federalist structure however is rooted in the failure of power 
sharing and the further ethnicization of Ethiopian politics. First and foremost, local 
governments do not exercise sufficient decision-making power and self rule to act as 
autonomous entities. Second, elected politicians in local governments do not exercise 
authority on budgetary, economic and social affairs. Rather, they are tightly controlled by 
officials in regional public services. Third, regional administrations themselves suffer 
from inadequate administrative and personnel capacity, as well as a poor revenue base, 
which ensures their continued reliance on the central government. Finally, politicians at 
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the zonal level increasingly are chosen by the central government and are accountable to 
the federal administration as opposed to the people. The “system maintains a heavy 
monolithic structure, that ensures the heavy influence of the center on the periphery”.80 
This ineffective devolution of power and responsibility is not only visible at the national 
and sub-national level, but also at the local wereda
81
 and kebele levels.  
As with the earlier centralized political system, the current federal structure in 
Ethiopia can be characterized as semi-authoritarian ethnic federalism”.82 Semi-
authoritarianism is used to describe the tight control exercised by central authorities on 
lower levels of governance “through the instrumentality of single ethnic-based parties 
that are affiliated with the ruling party”.83 
The challenge of many federal systems is to correct regional disparities and bring about 
even and balanced development among different regions. Unless governments are able to 
provide equal development opportunities the persistence of regional economic differences 
can generate resentment that can threaten the viability of the federal arrangement.
84
 
 
So far, the heavy reliance on the central governance by the regions
85
 has created central 
government monopoly over the most lucrative sources of revenue, economic 
underdevelopment of the regions, a lack of revenue sources and a limited capacity to 
mobilize adequate resources for development.
86
  
 
Conclusion 
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 Based on the level of structural and political adjustments made by countries that 
liberalized but went no further, it is clear that a major democratic deficit has emerged in 
many developing countries. Marina Ottaway has described and defined this political 
phenomenon as semi-authoritarianism. She argues that countries with semi-authoritarian 
characteristics can no longer be accurately described as transitional and are in a semi-
authoritarian state by design. The current analysis of recent political trends confirms her 
hypothesis that most countries, including Ethiopia, are semi-authoritarian by design. 
However, while Ottaway‟s framework is designed to make sense of current political 
patterns, it neglects complex historic adversities that to a large extent have facilitated the 
emergence of semi-authoritarianism. Appropriately, the next chapter will analyze the past 
three regime changes that have facilitated this major political restructuring in Ethiopia 
and it will attempt to identify patterns that may have had a direct effect on the emergence 
of semi-authoritarianism.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
A CLOSE LOOK AT ETHIOPIA’S TURBULENT 
POLITICAL AND ETHNIC HISTORY 
 
To foretell the destiny of a nation, 
 it is necessary to open the book that tells of her past. 
 
~ Hosé Rizal~ 
 
Introduction 
 To this point, we have asserted that the current Ethiopian government is semi-
authoritarian by design. Ottaway‟s theory is valuable in identifying the current trends of 
democratic deficits. However, it ignores critical factors, which can help to situate semi-
authoritarianism such as inherited political legacies, dictatorial traditions, ethnic divisions 
and development differentials. Accordingly, this chapter will analyze Ethiopia‟s political 
trajectory from a historic perspective. Specifically, focus will be directed to Ethiopia‟s 
last three regimes: the Monarchy, the socialist Derg regime, followed by a consideration 
of the EPRDF.  In order to fully ascertain whether or not Ethiopia is semi-authoritarian 
by design, semi-authoritarianism by default must be ruled out. In the Ethiopian case, 
semi-authoritarianism by design is supported by current policy decisions, while past 
political organizational practices give evidence of semi-authoritarianism by default. 
 
Background Information 
As Javier Gozalbez suggests in Touching Ethiopia, "the origin of Ethiopia is 
largely the origin of us all". Indeed, anthropologists believe East Africa‟s Great Rift 
Valley traversing Ethiopia from southwest to northeast is the site of the origin of 
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humankind. Today, the Horn of Africa, comprised of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, 
and Sudan, is the “hottest conflict zone in the world”.87  
Recorded Ethiopian history can be traced back 3,000 years to the Axumate 
Empire originating in the central highlands of the present day Tigray, and it was extended 
into the Amharan highlands by Emperor Tewodoros II. In 1872, the Tigreyan chieftain 
became Emperor Yohannes IV, who took the empire into present southern Oromia and 
the far southeastern part of Somali land. Ethiopia‟s imperialist expansion continued under 
the king of Shoa, Menelik II, who expanded Ethiopia‟s borders into Somali land, as well 
as the current provinces of Southern Nations, Nationalities and People‟s Regional State, 
southwestern Oromia and Gambella. 
With the exception of five years of Italian occupation from 1936 to 1941, Ethiopia 
never relinquished sovereignty to a European power. At the end of Word War II, the last 
emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, took advantage of Italy‟s defeat by the allied forces 
and brought Eritrea into Ethiopia as a federated State. He eventfully dissolved the 
federation in 1961 and Eritrea became part of Ethiopia until Eritrea‟s independence in 
1991. 
 
Under the Devine Rule of the Emperor 
Ethiopia‟s monarchs exercised absolute power and were the ultimate source of 
law. Menelik II prided himself on being a direct descendant of the Shewan branch
88
 of 
the Solomonic Dynasty, which claimed descent from King Solomon of ancient Israel, and 
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the Queen of Sheba, who is said to have brought the arc of the covenant to Ethiopia.
89
 
Legend was used to sanctify the house as well as gather the support of the Ethiopian 
people and define Ethiopian nationality.
90
 Consequently, the Ethiopian state did not build 
on local identities, but rather placed these identities under the feudal dominance of the 
Shewan-Amhara ruling class.
91
 Two thirds of conquered lands were confiscated and 
declared state domain for the benefit of the imperial army, and only the remaining one 
third was left to the conquered peoples.
92
 
Selassie further consolidated Menelik‟s imperial legacy not only by illegally 
annexing Eritrea, but also through the introduction of a national taxing system, the 
prohibition of local taxation by regional lords, the establishment of a paid civil service, 
the creation of a national army, and the prohibition of any local feudal armies.
93
 Selassie 
further accentuated the myth of a divine monarchy. For example, a poster displayed in 
Addis Ababa during the first parliamentary elections following the enactment of the 1955 
constitution depicts the emperor receiving the new constitution from an angel, a clever 
allusion to Moses receiving the Ten Commandments from on high. The depiction of a 
“voting booth in the corner of the poster was the only reminder that in a constitutional 
system citizens actually play a role”.94 
Clearly, Emperor Selassie governed through a highly centralized power structure 
grounded on the monarch‟s divine right to rule, and artificially constructed symbols of 
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the institutionalized monarchy such as Orthodox Christianity. He successfully established 
a hierarchy of elites and governed through patrimonial rule. According to witness 
accounts, 
People would approach His Benevolent Highness by turns, saying why they needed 
money […] Any expenditure, anywhere in the Empire, of more than ten dollars required 
his personal approval, and if a minister came to ask his approval for spending only one 
dollar, he would be praised.
95
  
 
Although he preferred ruling through propaganda, favors and personalized 
alliances, Selassie did not shy away from coercion and repression. He preferred to 
maintain his power through a well-paid army.  During his rule the budget allocation to the 
army and police, together composed of one hundred thousand members, was forty 
percent of the national budget, while thirty million farmers received only one per cent.
96
 
Such budgetary allocations did provide the emperor with the desired security 
establishment, however it also increased dissatisfaction among his subjects. Fear was 
occasioned by the use of a widespread and intrusive intelligence network turning 
neighbors into spies for the monarchy. As Ryszard Kapuściński suggested, “…ears 
appeared everywhere, sticking up out of the ground, glued to the walls, flying through the 
air, hanging on doorknobs, hiding in offices, lurking in crowds, standing in doorways, 
jostling in the marketplace”.97 Emperor Selassie used the tools of intimidation and 
coercion to maintain loyalty and unswerving support. Moreover, he drew on State 
resources to anchor a patrimonial series of networks benefiting the few while proclaiming 
his rule for all. However, he unintentionally created a point of no return. First and 
foremost, he provoked an intensified identity awakening among ethnic communities, and 
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second, his use of patron-client networks bred a predatory elite without any leadership 
vision: 
“Development” enabled the emperor to strengthen his personal rule through his 
skill in co-opting modernizing elites to the service of traditional institutions. Such 
cooption of “modernizing” elites weakened both their inclination and their capacity to 
force Haile Selassie‟s government to accommodate in reality more of the extensive and 
broadly based change its “reforms” appeared to envisage. Such elites enhanced their 
wealth and privilege within a system that left the majority vulnerable to economic and 
ecologic catastrophe, thereby creating a leadership vacuum when that system began to 
crumble in 1974.
98
 
 
Coup D’état: A Thunderbolt from the Clear Blue Sky 
Haile Selassie‟s biggest policy mistake, and certainly the one that received the 
most international attention, was his inaction in addressing the overwhelming famine in 
the provinces of Tigre, Welo and east Ogaden where whole tribes perished of hunger in 
the early 1970s.
99
 In 1973, Jonathan Dimbley, a young journalist from London, produced 
a documentary under the title of Ethiopia the Unknown Famine. The documentary 
facilitated an outburst of unprecedented humanitarian response both in aid and aid 
workers, as well as an invasion of foreign correspondents. Media reports caused further 
embarrassment for the Monarchy by pointing out that thousands of Ethiopians were dying 
of hunger next to markets and stores full of food.  They highlighted that mass starvation 
was a direct result of the established feudal system on top of aid misappropriation.
100
 
More precisely, drought caused a poor harvest and farmers had to give up all the food to 
the landowners. Speculators in turn drove prices upward on the open market such that 
hardly anyone could afford the price of wheat.
101
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Ethiopian society as a whole was experiencing more and more unrest leading to 
calls for a revolution. The initial ambition of the revolutionaries was to unmask the deity. 
According to Kapuściński, Mengistu Neway, the commander of the Imperial Guard 
carefully orchestrated one of the turning points of the “revolution”. He demonstrated to 
university students in Addis Ababa the dry bread the rebels fed to dignitaries closest to 
the Emperor. 
This event was a shock that the students never forgot. One of Haile Selassie‟s closest and 
most trusted officers represented the Emperor – a divine being, with supernatural 
attributes – as a man who tolerated corruption in the Palace, defended his backward 
system, and accepted the misery of millions of his subjects. That day the fight began, and 
the university never again knew peace. The tumultuous conflict between the Palace and 
the university, lasting almost fourteen years, engulfed scores of victims and ended only 
with the overthrow of the Emperor.
102
  
 
As unrest intensified and the army experienced increasing mutinies, the 
Emperor‟s perspective was that the 1968 uprising was like a “thunderbolt from clear blue 
sky”.103 Events progressed quickly and simultaneously. While the Imperial Guard was 
busy maintaining order in the capital, soldiers in the southern province of Sidamo 
rebelled and arrested their superiors. Due to an international crisis in energy, the 
Ethiopian Minister of Commerce raised gasoline prices prompting taxi drivers, followed 
by teachers and high school students to strike. In the midst of confusion, despair and 
abuse, police forces killed three students and wounded two. To show support, angry and 
embittered university students took to the streets and strikers made a move towards the 
palace. At the same time, the second division of the army rebelled in Eritrea and the 
army‟s fourth division proceeded to surround Addis Ababa. During the last few months 
of the rebellion, the emperor made a futile attempt at organizing a succession ceremony. 
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At the same time, the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), Derg in 
Amharic, started arresting dignitaries, in a clever attempt “to encircle the ancient 
monarch in his own Palace, in his lair”.104 Five hundred dignitaries and courtiers were 
gradually arrested creating a “sinking emptiness around the Emperor”.105 The Derg made 
their final move by arresting His Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie, “the head of Church, 
the Chosen one of God, the ruler of men‟s souls”.106  
 
Ethiopia Tikdem: Ethiopia Under the Derg 
 The Derg, formally known as the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, 
Police and Territorial Army was established on June 21, 1974 with Major Mengistu Haile 
Mariam of the Third Division as its elected leader.
107
 Although coup organizers utilized 
the suffering of every day Ethiopians, change under the new administration was 
controlled from the top, through the military, not the people. The revolution brought 
neither social justice nor economic development. Populist and egalitarian demands by the 
military were addressed under the motto of Ehiopia Tikdem,
108
 meaning Ethiopia First, 
but there was no agreement among Ethiopians about what the state should be, either 
politically or territorially. Some of the opposition movements, the Eritrean ones in 
particular, proposed state disintegration in their quest for independence, while others 
foresaw a change in the unitary structure of the country to a federal one. Others still 
accepted the Ethiopian state as a unitary one with its existing borders calling for a new 
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form of political administration, but they lacked consensus as to what form the new 
administration should take.
109
 
Differing opinions were soon manifested in emerging fractions of the elite with 
the emergence of new political parties such as the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement, with 
the Amharic acronym of MEISON, composed mostly of returning political exiles. 
Another party with a strong indigenous base was the Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary 
Party (EPRP). The Derg in turn set up an elaborate selection process of a fifty member 
civilian advisory council, the Yememakert Shengo, which it consulted on selected policy 
decisions. Soon the Yememakert Shengo issued its version of Ethiopian socialism, or 
Hebrettesebawiner, a philosophy of revolution which stated: “equality, self-reliance, the 
dignity of labor, the supremacy of the common good, and the indivisibility of the 
Ethiopian nation”.110 
The EPRP infiltrated the youth and labor movements and had influence in rural 
areas, while MEISON established a closer working relationship with the Derg. To deal 
with the challenges of multi-party politics, by February 3, 1977 Mengistu reasserted his 
authority and what came to be known as “red terror” was unleashed on the EPRP and 
sympathizers. The MEISON leadership, which always had at the ready lists of people to 
be appointed and people to be executed, was only too happy to provide the names of 
EPRP ringleaders and members to be eliminated summarily. The reactions against EPRP 
were all the more violent because it was the EPRP that started the assassination cycle 
with its own “white terror”, “killing whole families, killing children in school yards, 
gunning down husbands waiting in cars for their wives and fathers dropping their kids off 
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at school, assassinating young members of a family and dumping the bodies in front of 
the house to shock and brutalize the rest of the family”.111 
 
The Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE), Bureaucracy and the Constitution 
In 1979, the Derg‟s process of party formation yielded the Commission for 
Organizing the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE). The Commission began 
recruiting for the Workers‟ Party of Ethiopia (WPE), which was launched officially in 
September 1984. With the formation of the WPE, high priority was given to the 
formation of the Peoples‟ Democratic Republic with the goal to stabilize the political 
system, and bring to fruition what was promised in 1974 and spelled out in the 1976 
National Revolution Program.
112
 Thus, a 354 member Constitutional Draft Commission 
convened on February 14, 1984 to discuss and endorse a draft constitution prior to its 
being debated and endorsed by the people at large.
113
 The draft constitution sought to 
consolidate the gains of the revolution by incorporating Marxist principles and structures 
into a new socialist, democratic and revolutionary order.
114
 The key provisions of the 
constitution included Article 3 stating that power is vested in the people, not the Emperor, 
and Article 85 outlining that the executive is accountable to the Shengo,
115
 which 
represents the working people. 
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On February 1, 1987 ordinary Ethiopians participated in their first referendum. 
Ninety-six per cent of registered voters participated with 81 per cent approving the 
constitution, 18 per cent rejected it, and one per cent cast invalid votes.
116
 The 
referendum was followed by a national election on June 14. This time 87.7 per cent of 
those registered voted, and 813 National Shengo deputies took their seats in the PDRE 
Founding Congress.
117
 The National Shengo‟s first order of business was the approval of 
seventeen proclamations, with the most important ones being:  
 The adoption of the Constitution as the law of the land 
 The declaration of the establishment of the People‟s Republic of Ethiopia 
 The country‟s reconfiguration into administrative structures involving the creation 
of five regions: Eritrea, Tigray, Aseb, Dire Dawa and Ogaden, each with a 
degree of internal autonomy
118
 
 
The Derg and Polarization of National Identities 
The Derg hoped to find an acceptable solution to Ethiopia‟s ethnic diversity. The 
government went to great lengths to effectively weaken tribal institutions. They were 
viewed both by the state and some radical members of the local community as primordial 
and inimical to modernity and socialism. The Derg also believed that the traditional 
associations would hinder the universal solidarity of oppressed peoples.
119
 The first signs 
of radical political change appeared with the formation of units of political advisers or 
„cadres‟ whose mandate was to re-educate ethnic groups and radically reform „tribal‟ and 
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kinship-based relations.
120
 At the grassroots level, people were instructed to abandon their 
„primitive‟, „bad‟ customs along with „unproductive‟ behavior.121 The „cadres‟ have 
strategically tried to eliminate the traditional rituals of chiefs and folk-healers and 
dishonor them by striping them of traditional body decorations and armor associated with 
their status, and forced them to break traditional dietary taboos.
122
 Through theft, 
blackmail, the destruction of valuable cultural property and arbitrary imprisonment, 
government officials caused social upheaval and internal conflict in many communities. 
The Derg continued to take steps to institutionalize its revolutionary policies and 
made its „nationalities policy‟ clear in the “Program of the National Democratic 
Revolution” in 1976. The Program guaranteed the rights of formerly oppressed groups to 
their culture and language while the Constitution guaranteed “equal development of all 
nationalities […] in accordance with the teaching of Marxism-Leninism”.123 Article 35 of 
the Program stated that the “historical identity and class unity of all nationalities who 
have for centuries lived together bound by blood, common customs and history, under 
state administration, shall be encouraged”.124 
The identities of Ethiopians were further polarized with Article 9 of the 
Constitution, which restructured the country into 24 “administrative and autonomous 
regions”, in order to “give democratic expression to the rights of nationalities and a 
Marxist-Leninist solution to the “nationalities issue”.125 The government drafted a new 
map of „autonomous‟ and „administrative regions‟. The Institute for the Study of 
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Ethiopian Nationalities (ISEN), a politically oriented research body directly responsible 
to the Workers‟ Party of Ethiopia, was established in March 1983.126 The Institute 
identified 74 nationalities.
127
 The definition of nationality was based on four points: 
common language, common culture and historical unity, common territory and limited 
economic autonomy.
128
  
The radical restructuring of rural society into twenty-four administrative regions 
and five autonomous regions, was somewhat problematic due to the fact that “ „tribal‟ 
groups are not fixed, unitary or bounded units with an immutable cultural profile or neat 
territorial boundaries”129 in fact, some groups are spread over two or three states. As 
anthropologist John Abbink argued: 
The drawing of such a map is based on one historical moment in time, a „freezing‟ of 
labels. It also omits reference to the politico-economic dimension affecting group 
relations, and does not reflect the actual composition, varying degrees of self-
identification, and social dynamics of groups. The classification has an obvious 
prescriptive dimension: they are defined from above.
130
 
 
State restructuring, resettlement schemes, and villagization schemes
131
 as well as 
the „re-education‟ of populations by government officials and cadres resulted in the 
erosion of traditional identities. It has also interfered with settlement patterns and social 
organizations that had previously maintained a relative isolation from encompassing state 
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arenas.
132
 Indeed, the Derg regime artificially instilled and enforced a system where 
ordinary people had no choice but to adopt an elementary herd behavior. People were 
artificially “made to „discover‟ their newly detected identities, without subjecting the 
process to critical examination”.133 Thus, the end result was a political culture where 
rights to cultural expression, territorial recognition and the use of native language was 
guaranteed by the Constitution while at the same time government policy set in motion an 
aggressive process of large-scale ethnic fragmentation. These policies along with the 
oppression of civil liberties have led to an increase in distinct small ethnic groups and 
unrest among the larger ones such as the Tigray, the Oromo and the Somali manifesting 
in almost two decades of civil war. The Derg‟s policies undermined the cohesion and 
order of traditional Ethiopian society. The administration successfully eliminated natural 
local leaders, traditional political participation at a local level and destroyed any 
remaining confidence in national identity and government at the national level. 
 
Ethnic Resistance and the Liberation Movement 
The Derg‟s emphasis on the nationalities projected a newly found sense of pride, 
strength and confidence among ethnic communities. Not surprisingly, political opposition 
as well as armed resistance against the Derg became anchored in an ethnic identity. 
Resistance groups such as the Tigreyan People‟s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Eritrean 
People‟s Liberation Front (EPLF), the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and the 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) mobilized around identity. Their only sense of solidarity 
was in their common agenda to overthrow the Derg.  
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From a political perspective, the end of the Mengistu regime was signaled by an 
abortive coup orchestrated in 1989 while Mengistu was on a state visit to East Germany 
in search of military aid.
134
 Mengistu returned and brutally suppressed the coup. 
However, in the process, his army began to collapse from within. Whole military units 
defected to join opposition forces. Over the next two years, the TPLF and the EPRDF 
came to control all of Tigre, large segments of Wollo, Gondar, and Shoa.
135
 In Eritrea, all 
but the major towns of Asmara, Massawa, and Assab were under the EPLF‟s control.136 
In 1991, due to increased pressure from the civil war, Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe thereby 
ending 17 years of military dictatorship.
137
 The power vacuum, resulting from Mengistu‟s 
“self-imposed exile”,138 was filled by the EPRDF, which advanced into the capital and 
took power. 
EPRDF‟s ascension to political power was first sanctioned at a U.S.-brokered 
peace conference held in London on May 27, 1991 among representatives of the EPLF, 
EPRDF and OLF.
139
 The conference was a major turning point in Ethiopian political 
history as the EPRDF announced that it intended to maintain law and order in the capital 
and establish a “provisional, broad-based government responsible for introducing a 
democratic system based on political pluralism”.140 At first, the EPRDF sought to rectify 
some of the underlying problems that made ethnic fragmentation so predominant in 
Ethiopian politics. The plan was to form a broad-based political pact involving twenty 
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different political organizations and groups.
141
 However, groups opposed to the EPRDF 
leadership such as the EPRP, and the All-Ethiopian Socialist movement and the Coalition 
of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF) were excluded.
142
 
 
The EPRDF and Ethnic Federalism 
The increased politicization of peoples whose political ambitions were repressed 
under the previous regimes was expressed in ethnically organized liberation movements. 
In order to address the country‟s ethnic diversity, the newly formed Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia (TGE) attempted to draft a Constitution where power would be 
decentralized from the center to the states introducing „ethnic federalism‟. The Federal 
Republic of Ethiopia was divided into nine states and two special cities, Addis Ababa and 
Dire Dawa. Six states – Afar, Amhara, Harari, Oromia, Somalia and Tigray – were 
dominated by a single ethnic group while three, Beneshangul/Gumez, Gambella and the 
Southern Nations, were multiethnic.
143
 States were further divided into 66 administrative 
zones, 550 wereda and six special districts.
144
  
In accordance with the liberal vision, Ethiopia‟s new Charter also articulated the 
TGE‟s commitment to the fundamental principles of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights according individuals‟ freedom of conscience, expression, association and 
peaceful assembly as well as the right to engage in unrestricted political activity.
145
  In a 
dramatic and unique innovation, Article 2 of the charter “asserts the right of all of 
Ethiopia‟s nationalities to self-determination, the preservation of national identities of 
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each group, and the right of each nationality to govern its own affairs within the context 
of federated Ethiopia”.146 Article 13 further states that “there shall be a law establishing 
local and regional councils defined on the basis of nationality”.147 However, the Charter 
failed to outline what self-determination entailed and by what means autonomy could be 
achieved. Many Ethiopians viewed the provision of the Charter and the creation of 
administrative zones as the balkanization of their country. As one critic notes: 
The leadership of TPLF does not understand that the problem of ethnic identity is one, 
which is fraught with many complexities. A person can be defined as a member of an 
ethnic group in one of three ways: by history, by choice and by opposition. … Dividing 
Ethiopians along ethnic lines runs the risk of accentuating and freezing ethnic identities in 
ways that may undermine the meaning and value of Ethiopian citizenship. The more 
ethnic groups turn upon themselves and concentrate on what divides them from others, 
the more it costs their members in terms of their chances/opportunities in the larger 
system. Also, to freeze ethnic identities runs the risk of inter-ethnic friction and conflict, a 
risk that has already materialized in much of southern Ethiopia.
148
 
 
The government‟s attempts to decentralize power have resulted in what Keller 
terms as “a type of putting together federalism”. In short, the federal government has not 
honored its commitment of power distribution. This can be seen with revenue sharing 
between the two levels of government.  For example, most taxing powers rest with the 
federal government while most of the expenditure obligations are the responsibility of the 
regional authorities.  Thus, administrative regions cannot help but be reliant on the central 
power for revenue transfers, which prevent independent decisions and any significant 
locally defined development.  
 Symbolic power sharing has led to an inability to determine who controls the 
resources of an area and who are the beneficiaries. This creates a problem in provinces 
with multiple ethnicities since people resort to violence to solve their grievances as 
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opposed to looking for policy deficiencies in the system. For example, in 2003, some 400 
Anuak civilians were killed in Gambella by mobs and soldiers.
149
 Human Rights Watch 
officials documented military raids on Anuak neighborhoods and villages. According to 
eyewitness accounts, “many of the victims have been shot down from behind as they tried 
to flee […] others where killed in chance encounters with military patrols in the 
countryside”.150The genocide was a direct result of ethnic conflict as well as power 
struggles for control over resources especially ancestral Anuak land which had been 
taken over by Sudanese refugees. Oil resources have been discovered as well in 
Gambella, which has generated intense interest in asserting central government control. 
The overemphasis on primary identities mixed with struggles over key resources such as 
land and oil, can quickly inflame ethnic tensions and lead to violence and further 
fragmentation.
151
  
In this same context, the federal system has ignited more ethnic conflict due to the 
fact that the Tigreyan peoples have made the central government as their preserve. Other 
ethnies see the federal model, given the way it is, used by the centre to assert dominance 
over the regions, as a Tigreyan drive to become pre-eminent. Moreover, ethnic groups 
have different concepts of territorial boundaries while other groups are faced with historic 
grievances. For example, the Amhara, one of the largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia is not 
represented in the Tigreyan-led government. Amharans that constitute a third of 
Ethiopia‟s population feel victimized by the current government. From a historic 
perspective, Amharans consider themselves to be politically and culturally dominant, and 
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they argue that the EPRDF government is exploiting this history to conduct propaganda 
campaigns, labeling the ethnic group as “exploiters, colonialists and oppressors”.152 The 
government is also trying to prevent Amharas from taking office in the southern regions 
of the country, and through a process that is termed „ethnic cleansing‟ by the group, many 
Amharans are also removed from civil service positions by their political opponents.
153
 
Ethnic tensions also rose in Oromo areas sometimes erupting into armed conflict. In part 
this was due to the pace by which administrative reforms took place and Oromo 
expectations that “reforms could eventually position the Oromo peoples to declare their 
independence from Ethiopia. Elements of the OLF had long hoped to establish the 
independent state of Oromia”.154 However, it is clear that the TGE‟s intentions were to 
grant regional autonomy to ethnic groups only in the context of a unified Ethiopia.  
 Due to a lack of genuine power sharing experience as well as an attempt to 
maintain central government subjugation, the EPRDF engages in divide and rule tactics 
to maintain power. As pointed out by Lahra Smith in her analysis of ethnicity and voting 
patterns, 
African citizens are members of two types of political communities in the same temporal 
and spatial world. The first is their civic-republican community, which is most often their 
ethnic or communal group. This community demands participation and fulfillment of 
duties to the collectivity. But at the same time, these individuals are citizens of modern 
nation-state, guided by liberal conception of status and a focus on rights rather than 
duties.
155
  
 
This concept of dual citizenship with an emphasis on one‟s ethnic group and tribe 
emerged as a necessary survival element under Selassie, the Derg, and now the EPRDF.  
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If one is responsible first and foremost to fulfill his/her duties to the community 
then political leaders are chosen based on their power to deliver goods and services to 
their ethnic base rather than their ability to advance the interests of the Ethiopian state. 
Corruption and patrimonialism are not only entrenched in the political and administrative 
systems but are also culturally expected and accepted. In neo-patrimonial political 
systems, personal, face-to-face informal relations substitute formal relations and decision-
making in modern institutional settings. Kin, clan and ethnic community are the bedrock 
for such instrumental relationships.
156
 Firmly anchored ethnic power barons compete at 
the centre for access to State resources, and, ultimately the more ambitious seek to build 
coalitions to displace the political leader. Thus, “rulers regularly rotate office holders „to 
regulate and control rent seeking‟ to prevent rivals from developing their own power 
base, and to demonstrate their own power‟”.157 In a similar fashion, mutually benefiting 
obligations and transactions are set up where administrative and military personnel are 
ultimately responsible to the chief patron and not to the electorate they claim to represent 
or to the hierarchy of command that is supposed to formalize authority in the military and 
police.
158
 
 The institutionalization of patrimonialism is in part a direct result of cultural 
linkages. However, it must be pointed out that patron-client systems are also rooted in a 
general lack of national unity combined with a poor understanding of liberal democracy 
and its institutional norms. According to Lefort, many Ethiopians believe that one‟s 
power to govern emanates from God: “It doesn‟t matter who I vote for, since it‟s God 
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who decides who will be elected”.159 Thus, to submit oneself to the absolutism of those in 
power is to act in accordance with divine will.
160
 In this context, core elements of 
democracy such as “competitiveness among voters, candidates, parliamentarians or 
members of congress in articulating their public views, developing consensus”161 are 
absent. It is also perceived that those who acquire wealth are more intelligent than the rest 
of the population for they are more aggressive and have more political clout. Hence, they 
emerge as the natural leaders creating a system where money and individualism 
influences politics rather than virtue, issues and equal competition. People attach 
themselves to the wealthy in order to have any chance of reducing their vulnerability and 
to improve their life chances. Similarly to the place of wealth in driving political 
ambition, ruling political parties, which have access to State resources are tremendously 
advantages over opposition parties.  
 
Conclusion 
The current Ethiopian government engages in the politics of a centrally controlled 
system of regional governments under the banner of ethnic federalism. Ethnicity is the 
most crucial and controversial force in Ethiopian politics. The EPRDF maintains the 
principle of unconditional rights of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-
determination including secession. However, the Constitution is a superficial document 
adopted as a necessity due to Ethiopia‟s turbulent history and ethnic revival. First and 
foremost, the highly politicized threat to ethnic identities in Ethiopia is a direct 
consequence of Ethiopia‟s long monarchical rule. Until his removal from power, emperor 
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Haile Selassie attempted to project the image of an ethnically unified Ethiopia while 
suppressing the ethnic claims to self-determination of Oromo, Somali and Afar peoples. 
His imperial state maintained control over these territories through force. Ketemas
162
 
were established throughout the country in order to administer Oromo and Somali 
areas.
163
 These towns housed soldiers designated as “„watchman‟ of the crown”164 and 
were given the authority to maintain law and order as necessary.  
In turn, the Derg regime took advantage of the lack of an Ethiopian national 
identity to re-ignite ethnic consciousness and destroy the myth of monarchical divinity. 
Both the Derg and the EPRDF attempted to address and manage Ethiopia‟s ethnic 
question but change in both cases was implemented from the top down with a complete 
discrepancy between the policies envisioned by the political elites and the experiences 
and perceptions present at the grass-root level. Accordingly, resistance against the Derg 
was ethnically organized. Cooperation with the EPRDF could not be won without 
promising ethnic groups self-determination and equal participation in governance. 
Conversely,  
Today, as the federal system based on new ethnic regionalization is being implemented, 
the integrating forces of ethnic freedom appear to lose out against the centrifugal 
influences of ethnic conflict. The political experiment of adopting multiculturalism of 
ethnic groups is in danger of falling apart. In light of the historical context, basing nation 
building on a vision of multi-ethnic entity holds the potential for massive conflict as it 
may also fragment ethnic groups along lines of clan and lineage.
165
 
 
Thus, we can argue that the ideological, ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional and other 
cleavages, that often intertwine and conflict with one another, can be overwhelming to 
handle all at once by any government. In the case of the EPRDF, a centralized, semi-
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authoritarian model of governance is all too familiar and inherited from previous regimes. 
Consequently, there are strong dimensions to suggest that Ethiopia is semi-authoritarian 
by default as opposed to design.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SEMI-AUTHORITARIANISM AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE 
 
War made the state, and the state made war. 
~ Charles Tilly ~ 
 
Introduction 
This chapter builds on arguments presented earlier to show that the absence or 
presence of democratic governance is not a function of the governing elite alone. In the 
case of Ethiopia for example, different regimes tried to tackle administrative, structural 
and ethnic challenges through different political models. Yet it is clear that patterns of 
`negative ethnicity‟ are too great to be solved by democratization.166 Despite different 
ideological and structural agendas, regimes adopt similar patterns of rule, in other words, 
“individual political leaders or governments have limited influence on the establishment 
or preservation of democracy because of wider „systemic‟ factors”.167 Consequently, this 
chapter is designed to draw attention to the effects of centralization on multi-ethnic 
societies through the framework of dependency theory, democratic understanding and 
commitment at the ethnic level, nation building and potential disintegration, political 
skepticism and the role of the political elite in Ethiopian politics. 
 
Dependency Theory 
Dependency theorists argue that the absence or presence of democracy alone in 
the Third World is not a function of individual countries alone. Individual political 
leaders or governments have limited influence on the establishment or preservation of 
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democracy because of wider „systemic‟ factors. Aid donors, financial institutions, the 
international community at large, as well as influential powers such as the United States 
and the former Soviet Union, encouraged centralization in the third world because it fit 
with their framework of development, hierarchy in government structure, and post-
enlightenment rationalism.  
Asafa Jalata argues that Abyssinian
168
 leaders worked the international political 
arena to bring legitimacy to the Ethiopian colonial state under Amharan rule. Asafa looks 
at Ethiopia‟s long monarchical rule as well as more current regimes to draw on numerous 
examples. After the Italian occupation, for example, in 1941 Britain restored Haile 
Selassie to the throne along with his clientele government.
169
 In 1944, Britain also made a 
commitment “to build the Ethiopian bureaucracy by providing a British military mission 
for raising, organizing, and training a strong central army that could defend the Ethiopian 
state”.170  
In the 1950‟s, Selassie further relied on the influence of the United States to annex 
Eritrea. At the time, the United States regarded Ethiopia “as an investment toward the 
future realization of its wider interests in Africa”.171 In 1953, the two countries signed a 
mutual defense agreement in an effort to monitor Soviet activities on the continent. Up 
until the 1970‟s the United States continued funding Ethiopian development projects as 
well as providing trained and skilled personnel. American influence created a strong 
divide between the Amhara community in power and other ethnic groups. 
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Due to its anti-imperialist agenda during the liberation movement, the subsequent 
Derg military regime moved towards a socialist approach to development. The 
nationalization of American owned industries and the killing of sixty top former 
officials
172
 soured US-Ethiopian relations. At this point, the Derg regime allied itself with 
the Soviet Union, which in turn supplied the regime with arms “to keep the crumbling 
empire intact”.173 In 1991, under the optimism of “third wave democracy”, the United 
States intervened once more in Ethiopian politics by supporting Meles Zenawi and the 
TPLF to power in their challenge to the Derg as well as supporting the formation of the 
EPRDF. 
Even though the EPRDF period has seen local and international organizations 
report on election fraud, human rights abuses, and the lack of a democratic commitment 
by the regime, Ethiopia remains the beneficiary of considerable aid support. Asafa argues 
that as far as the United States is concerned, political stability and economic reform take 
precedence over democracy. And indeed, considering that many ethnic groups in Ethiopia 
stretch across borders – for example, the Borana, and Garre are found in Ethiopia and 
Kenya, with the Garre also in Somalia,
174
 and given the persistence of the Somalia 
fractionalization, regional stabilization remains fundamental to Western interests.  
 Although the EPRDF actively engages in a continuing centralization of power, 
this approach to governing has a long legacy in Ethiopia. Such centralization fuels 
mistrust towards governmental and ideological reform. To put this into perspective, over 
the past three regimes, for example, the process of political centralization undermined 
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ethnic communities in Southern Ethiopia. Centralization effectively marginalized and 
excluded indigenous and local cultures. In this process, indigenous cultures continued to 
exist, but these communities were not active participants in decision making at any level 
of governance.
175
 Aadland‟s research indicates that, “indigenous structures became 
nostalgic and rather mythological in the official polity”.176  Further, Harald Aspen, who 
has conducted field research in Northern Shäwa, also found that the distance between 
Ethiopian peasants and the central government, present and past, is characterized by deep 
power imbalances.
177
 The Derg government, for example, reinforced by a reformist 
socialist agenda failed in mass mobilization and participation.
178
 
Marxism belonged to, and was associated with a powerful and dictatorial State. Marxist 
ideology and organization probably also contributed to making the State into a factor that 
was matched only by Nature and God in unpredictability and power – although such 
perception was not new to the Ethiopian peasants after centuries of “Divine Rule” by 
dictatorial Emperors.
179
 
 
In present day Ethiopia, the continuing centralization of power under the EPRDF 
also results in all ideological, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional demands being 
directed to Addis Ababa. Thus, the combination of strong ethnic identities where cultural 
traditions have priority over power sharing, with a state, both current and past, that 
competes against these identities and is perceived as illegitimate and domineering  limits 
democratic breakthrough and consolidation. Furthermore, many Ethiopians project the 
impression that they are victims of a type of coercive democratization from the 
international community, while they are still trying to come to terms with political 
practices established by previous regimes that promote ethnic dominance and mistrust. 
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Political Skepticism 
 The absence of a democratic commitment and the strength of ethnic revival in 
Ethiopia can be attributed in part to the ethnicization of rule from the centre over the 
regions. Under monarchical rule and the Derg regime, most Ethiopians faced and 
succumbed to an absolutist state with an agenda perceived as the Amharaization. Other 
ethnic communities were treated as occupied territories. For the `ethnic others‟, they 
became subjects rather than citizens of an oppressive Ethiopian state. Under the EPRDF, 
a Tigrean minority is exerting powerful dominance over all other ethnic groups. The 
`ethnic others‟ turn inward and try to sustain their cultural values and identities in an 
uncertain world. 
Political uncertainty is thus the key element in the political arena for many ethnic 
communities. This uncertainty inhibits any turn to democratization.
180
 As eloquently 
described by Kapuściński, the overwhelming view in Ethiopia is that,  
On the street market a bullet is often worth more than the gun. Bullets are the most 
valuable currency on that market, more in demand than dollars. After all, what is a dollar 
but paper? A bullet can save your life. Bullets make your weapons more significant, and 
that makes you more significant. A man‟s life – what is that worth? Another man exists 
only to the degree that he stands in your way. Life doesn‟t mean much, but is better to 
take it from the enemy before he has time to deliver the blow.
181
 
 
Zero-Sum-Game Political Environment 
 Many elements of politics, especially the ones associated with authority, power 
and wealth, take on a different dimension in countries such as Ethiopia. `A winner take 
all‟ political environment predominates. Throughout Ethiopia‟s history, this zero-sum 
form of politics has led to unequal achievements and gains from regime formation. Thus, 
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there is a prevailing fear underlying `winner-take-all‟ political practices. In this political 
environment, first and foremost, efforts of democratization are quickly trumped by the 
politics of revenge in the form of inquiry commissions to punish the corruption and 
misrule of the previous regime”.182  
Second, “adversarial cooperation”,183 developed during the anti-Derg liberation 
movement, quickly evaporated and was replaced by political uncertainty once one group 
successfully gained power. Cooperative arrangements quickly melt away with the 
entrenchment of a new ethnic elite in power eager to direct State resources to themselves. 
Thus, coalition partners experience fear of regime capture by one group and the vicious 
cycle of ethnic power consolidation.  
Third, perceived political and economic power differentials may cause each group 
to experience political uncertainty. Different groups have different capabilities that they 
can convert into immediate opportunities and long-term economic and political growth 
and power. For example, it is estimated that medium sized groups, such as the Tigrean 
ethnic group in Ethiopia, have the most to lose.  “A group with a relatively lower 
conversion than its competitors might wonder if democratization might accelerate what 
already was an existing gap in economic capabilities between itself and its 
competitors”.184 This leads to the final point, namely that the political environment is 
plagued by “incumbent political uncertainty”185 which leads to political distrust, fear, and 
resentment.  “Incumbent groups may fear that they could lose a substantial margin of 
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their power and, perhaps, at the very extreme limit of the logic, their capacity to protect 
their security interest”.186  
Based on historical experiences, no group can be certain how it will fare after 
regime change and, under a democratic context after power alternations, “because they 
possess this defensive orientation, rational political groups are compelled to assess the 
magnitude of their gains from cooperation to democratize in terms of gains achieved by 
opponents”.187 The political party in power has access to state resources, hard currency, 
higher education, and civil service appointments. Opposition parties on the other hand are 
subjected to harassment and resource exclusion. Furthermore, Ethiopia has been plagued 
by high unemployment, national debt, property and land seizures, instability in bordering 
countries, frequent influx of refugees, as well as natural disasters. The potential for 
economic deterioration and scarcity heightens ethnic paranoia and ethno-regional 
nationalism. Ethnic groups cling to power in order to secure and retain control over 
territory and resources in order to maintain their political, economic, and social 
opportunity base. 
Maintaining power becomes vital not only for individuals in power, but also for 
the communities and ethnic groups that support the incumbent regime. For this reason, 
political rivals will cooperate if they achieve absolute gains, such as the removal of the 
Derg regime from power, but only if the distribution of political gains does not 
powerfully benefit their rivals. This “system of adversarial cooperation”188 was evidenced 
by the rapid disintegration of the EPRDF coalition after 1991. As ethnic identities strived 
to apply the full aspects of ethnic and national self-determination guaranteed by the 
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constitution, the central government increasingly engaged in more restrictive 
authoritarian measures.  
 
Power Elites, Neo-patrimonialism and the Ethnic Card  
 In the context of Western democracies the office endows the office holder with 
authority and power; in Africa, the office exists because the person has authority.
189
 
Some political leaders opt for “life presidency” because they inwardly believe that their 
authority is permanent and the office exists for them.
190
 After all, in some tribal 
conceptions of African authority, chiefs tend to remain chiefs throughout their lives. 
What is more, the African chief is not constrained by the separation of executive, judicial 
and legislative powers; he encapsulates all three. Often as well, there is no separation 
between religion and politics. Healers, shamans and spiritualists can be perceived as 
personally powerful and responsible for the state of the community in terms of all of its 
qualities. His/her power is mystical, and tenure of office can be perceived to be for 
his/her lifetime.
191
 Hence, “While African elites engage in the rhetoric of Western 
democracy, they at the same time exercise their authority in a personal, pervasive, and 
permanent manner”.192 Moreover, power can be contested by different actors – the 
politician, the wealthy `big man‟, the chief and the spiritualist. 
In a zero-sum political environment, from a neo-patrimonial perspective, the 
politics of ethnicity becomes a matter of survival. Again, Kapuściński puts this notion 
into context for us: 
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Money in a poor country and money in a rich country are two different things. In a rich 
country, money is a piece of paper with which you buy goods on the market. You are 
only a customer. Even a millionaire is only a customer. He may purchase more, but he 
remains a customer, nothing more. And in a poor country? In a poor country, money is 
wonderful, thick hedge, dazzling and always blooming, which separates you from 
everything else. Through that hedge you do not see creeping poverty, you do not smell 
the stench of misery, and you do not hear the voices of the human dregs. But at the same 
time you know all of that exists, and you feel proud because of your hedge. You have 
money; that means you have wings. You are the bird of paradise everyone admires.
193
 
 
Thus, ethnic survival, identity renegotiations, and inter-clan relations are intertwined with 
calculated gains and losses in terms of resources, political clout, and territory. As an 
example, relations between ethnic groups such as the Borana, Garre, Gabbra, and Somali 
have been reconfigured, and renegotiated under each Ethiopian regimes‟ ethnic 
restructuring policies. More recently with the introduction of ethnic federalism under the 
EPRDF, due to regional restructuring, the Garre and Gabbra, who share ethno-linguistic 
similarities both with the Oromo and Somali ethnic groups, were required to identify 
themselves with either Oromia or the Somali region.
194
 The alliance with one ethnic 
group and region over the other had political implications in terms of representation and 
access to resources.  
Despite the ethno-cultural similarities between the Garre and Gabbra, the inter-
regional alliance differed between the two groups. The Garre chose a Somali alliance, 
while the Gabbra had a hard time making a decision. This had significant political 
implications. Initially in 1991, “the Garre ethnic entrepreneurs”195 calculated that the 
OLF was one of the most important political forces in the country, only second to the 
TPLF. To counter this perceived political imbalance, the Garre and other Muslim Oromo 
clans re-branded the Somali Abbo Liberation Front (SALF) as the Oromo Abbo 
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Liberation Front (OALF).
196
 This made the Borana, an ethnic group that identifies itself 
with the Oromo, suspicious since they saw the OALF as a continuation of the SALF in 
symbols and clan constituency.
197
 Furthermore, the new ethnic alliance was also 
perceived to serve the interests of Garre traditional leader Haji Mohammed Hassen 
Gebaba, who had ambitions to take the office of the OLF representative
198
 in Moyale, a 
town between Somali and Oromo regions. The Borana were further angered by this, and 
saw the move as an attempt on the part of the Garre to make land claims and take 
advantage of the power vacuum in Addis Ababa, where the TGE was in the process of 
establishing the EPRDF. 
Garre - Borana relations had a direct effect on the Gabbra. The Gabbra 
traditionally lived within Borana dominated territories. To them the choice between 
Oromo and Somali regions resulted both in internal and inter-ethnic conflicts. Some 
Gabbra had demands for the establishment of a special woreda within the Borana zone of 
the Oromo territories, at the same time, some Gabbra leaders made public statements that 
the town of Moyale and its surrounding area should be assigned to the Somali region.
199
 
At the end of 1991 the political tensions in the region led to conflict. Hundreds of lives 
were lost and thousands were displaced.
200
 
At this point, it is important to ask why the town of Moyale is so important to 
both the Garre and the Borana. By becoming allied with the Somali, the Garre were able 
to legitimize and claim territory from the Borana as their own. Furthermore, they also 
claimed territories – nine Borana permanent water wells, and the town of Moyale – that 
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were used both by the Garre and the Borana, but were considered traditional Borana 
areas.
201
 In 1994, the federal government assigned some of these resources to the Garre 
on the grounds that there are more Garre than Borana in the area.
202
 The Borana felt that 
this was an unfair decision, and Moyale is still being contested. The town houses two 
conflicting administrative bodies as the Oromo and Somali have their own body of 
police, judicial system, and education system.
203
 
The federal government has attempted to solve the ethnic animosity through 
„reconciliation‟ conferences, and through a scheduled referendum to be held in October 
2004.
204
 In the end, the referendum could not be carried out due to disagreements 
between the two administrations on the election of public observers and voter 
registrations.
205
 Oromo officials claimed that since the Garre ethnic group is 
transnational, people were brought in from Kenya and Somalia to secure a majority vote 
for the Somali.
206
 Somali officials in turn argued that the referendum was cancelled due 
to Oromo influence at the regional level.
207
 
Two conclusions emerge. First, unity and sensitivity of primordial ethnic 
sentiments for one‟s ethnic political candidate at the cost of hostility and insecurity 
towards the other ethnic group and its candidate are correlative.
208
 Second, 
democratization is associated with the politics of ethnic competition creating political 
instability. These conclusions are further supported by the experience of the Gabbra 
ethnic group. Due to the Gabbra – Borana conflict in 1991, the displaced Gabbra fled to 
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northern Oromia. The group was given refuge by the Guji, an Oromo clan, traditionally in 
conflict with the Borana.
209
 However, the Gabbra were once again displaced in 2005 
when the Guji became suspicious that the Gabbra were going to remain in the north, and 
demand their own administration and territory.
210
 
As far as Ethiopian politics is concerned, ethnicity, ethnic alliances, and ethnic 
competition permeate politics at every level. “I am because we are”211 is a very much-
valued concept. However, the “we” does not refer to the nation state, instead it is applied 
to one‟s ethnic group.  Loyalty to the ethnic group‟s wellbeing and advancement is a 
political strategy exploited by the elite, and very much endorsed at a grass-root level. As 
demonstrated in the examples, this type of political environment can pose a challenge to 
democratization and democratic consolidation. Ethnic-based competitive elections can 
easily lead to violence. 
  
Nation building and State Disintegration 
 Ottaway‟s arguments in her essay Introduction: The Crisis on the Ethiopian State 
and Economy contradict her later work on semi-authoritarianism. Ottaway accentuates 
that, 
The ideal type of the twentieth-century state is a nation-state, with a democratic 
government capable of controlling the territory effectively and of satisfying at least 
minimally the needs of its citizens. Moreover, this state is supposed to come about 
through a process of self-determination, thus to be accepted by its citizens rather than 
imposed from above.
212
  
 
It is clear that today, 20 years after 1991, Ethiopia still does not meet the requirements set 
out by Ottaway. The government is not able to control the territory effectively, citizens‟ 
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needs are not satisfied, democratization is a top down imposition, and most importantly 
there is no such thing as an accepted Ethiopian state by many ethnic groups 
encompassing significant levels of population living in the country. 
As discussed in Chapter II, democracy has become the preferred form of 
governance due to international pressure as well as a counterrevolution to the dictatorial 
rule experienced in association with former socialist experiments. Accordingly, both 
domestic and foreign actors lose sight of the dilemma of states such as Ethiopia which are 
faced with ethnic disintegration. First and foremost, Ethiopia is an imperial state rather 
than a nation state. And second, the state is not legitimate because it is not democratic. 
The state is based on power arbitrarily exercised from the top, rather than popular 
consensus, while at the same time the incapacity to control the territory and satisfy the 
needs of the population result in semi-authoritarian rather than democratic governance. 
At this point, it is important to talk about the Oromo ethnic group in a larger 
context. The Oromo are central in the Ethiopian political context because they are the 
largest of the conquered ethno-national groups. Today, the Oromos make up 34.49 
percent of the Ethiopian population while the Amhara, the ethnic group in power during 
monarchical rule and during the Derg regime, make up 26.89 percent, the Somali 6.2 
percent, and the Tigray, the ethnic group with a clear dominance over the EPRDF, 
constitute 6.07 percent of the current population.
213
 It is also noteworthy that the Tigray, 
live in the impoverished northern region of Ethiopia, while the Oromo live in the fertile 
highlands.
214
 
 
                                                        
213
 John Ishiyama, “Ethnic Partisanship in Ethiopia”, in: National and Ethnic Politics, Volume 11 Issue ¾. 
July 2010. 295 
214
 Ibid.  
  67  
The Oromo have a distinct culture, language, religion, political as well as social 
structure, and value system. The Oromo believe in Waqaa, a concept of god from a 
monotheistic religious perspective.
215
 The Oromo believe that Waqaa created the 
universe along with all life forms with a sense of balance and harmony, for example male 
and female, young and old, spiritual and physical.
216
 Oromo people traditionally believe 
that this balance is necessary to prevent social collapse, and they abide by a set of moral 
and ethical laws called safuu.
217
 Resulting from a unique understanding of universal 
connectedness, the Oromo have a concept of collective property rights. They oppose the 
exploitation of nature and other human beings on the grounds that it “disrupts the peace 
and order of the cosmos”,218 and have a traditional democratic form of government called 
the gadaa. Within the gadaa structure, there is an eight-year power rotation, a system of 
checks and balances, and election by universal male suffrage.
219
 Although women are 
excluded from the gadaa, they are able to exercise and protect their rights through a 
parallel institution called the siqee.
220
 
Over the past three regimes the Oromo have suffered significant destruction and 
erosion of their cultural values and traditions. Colonization along with varied foreign 
ideological concepts and political restructuring means a loss of safuu to the Oromo. 
Furthermore, current conflicts over land resources with neighboring ethnic groups such as 
the Tigray, Amhara, Somali, and Afar also lead to a weakened concept of gadaa.
221
 
Through their oral traditions, the Oromo give testimony to the injustice of land loss, 
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genocide, slavery, rape, depopulation, and other atrocities suffered by generations of 
Oromo.
222
 Indeed, historic records indicate that during conquest, as much as five million 
Oromo, half of the population at the time, were killed.
223
 
Since Waqaa is intolerant of injustice, exploitation and domination, the 
suppression of their people to internal ethno-colonial rule is illegitimate. It disrupts the 
order of the cosmos. Furthermore, the maintenance of safuu prompts the Oromo “to 
protect the weak and calls for the congruence of individual and societal interests”.224 It is 
also worth pointing out that the highly centralized, top-down approach adopted by the 
past three Ethiopian regimes is in contradiction to the Oromo traditional governance. The 
Oromo choose religious tolerance not only for the traditional religion, but also Ethiopian 
Orthodox Christian, Islamic, Catholic, and Protestant faiths in order to focus on cultural 
unity, and prevent Oromo fragmentation along religious lines. The group‟s objective is 
ethno-linguistic unity under the banner of shared language, customs, and traditions for 
communal harmony and ethnic protection. Many ethnic groups within the Ethiopian 
border view a strong unified large Oromo population, with access to resource rich fertile 
land, a common language, and established social and political traditions, as a threat,
225
 or 
at least a serious challenge to the existing power structures within the Ethiopian state. 
In Ethiopia there is a deep-rooted continuity between old and new politics, 
governments of past and present share the same core values and ideas. As Tekle argues, 
these “core values and fundamental beliefs that unite the old and new polities pertain to, 
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and affect, not secondary and temporary issues but basic and enduring questions like the 
nature and purpose of the state, society, and government.”226 With no similarity between 
the Ethiopian polity and the modern concept of the nation-state, Ethiopia is experiencing 
negative nationalism which at best can be described as a “transitional stage between, on 
the one hand, a feudal polity in which sovereignty is fractionalized and power is 
personalized and, on the other, the modern state, which is „national‟ in character and in 
which sovereignty is based on the expressed will of the people”.227 At worst however, 
Ethiopia can be perceived as a state with high potential of disintegration accelerated by 
the democratic process. Once more, as Ottaway points out in Nation Building and State 
Disintegration, 
The rise of ethnic nationalism, with its destructive potential, has been triggered, in many 
cases, by promising development, namely, the opening up of authoritarian political 
systems and the beginning of democratic transition. Under pressure from their citizens 
and from aid donors, a majority of African governments are at least formally moving 
towards greater democracy. The two developments are linked: ethnic nationalism is 
increasing, at least in part, because of the greater openness of the political systems.
228
 
 
Clearly, state building and nation building, which in the early postcolonial period 
were seen as synonymous, are turning into conflicting forces.
229
 Multiethnic nations have 
too weak a common identity on which to build the democratic political community.
230
 
Therefore, ethnic nationalities that claim to predate the state are challenging its 
legitimacy. In simple terms, African countries like Ethiopia are failing at nation building 
because ethnic identities are strong, highly politicized, and ethnic groups and 
communities harbor resentment not only towards the present political elite, but for past 
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injustices as well. Furthermore, the elites at the top also have a lack of will, know how, 
and resources to foster a common identity through universal, homogenous education and 
a well-developed administrative system that could make the state a legitimate, and not an 
oppressive, presence.
231
 This concept challenges the superiority of democracy in states 
such as Ethiopia and challenges Ottaway‟s concept of semi-authoritarianism by design by 
suggesting that various factors have created the preconditions for semi-authoritarianism 
by default.  
 
Conclusion 
In the African context, democratic governance and democratization pose 
unforeseen challenges. From this perspective, stable political systems based on dominant 
one party systems guarantee the capacity of the state to reach quick and decisive 
decisions under both normal and crisis conditions.
232
 “Political competition 
(democratization) is anathema to many authoritarian regimes, and it also operates like an 
„invisible hand,‟ but is capable of exposing economic inefficiencies, political ineptitude, 
and other systemic defects of a non-competitive politico-economic system”.233 Some 
scholars question the relationship between democratization and systemic factors such as 
political skepticism, neo-patrimonialism, nation building challenges, and the probability 
of ethnic violence. They argue that while mature democracies with well-established 
institutional structures are not prone to conflict, the case with transitional democracies is 
different.  „Incomplete democratizing states‟ are unstable because, as in the case of 
Ethiopia, “political elites can easily mobilize nationalist support for violent conflict in 
                                                        
231
 Ibid. 86 
232
 Ibid. 64 
233
 Ibid. 74 
  71  
electoral competition”.234 In this context, compared to democratization, authoritarianism 
is equated with relative stability. Ethiopia as a state is engaging in semi-authoritarianism. 
However, there is convincing evidence that in order to reconcile complex historic 
legacies, ethnic nationalism, unequal access to resources, development policies favoring 
one ethnic group over another leads to semi-authoritarianism by default. 
This of course does not rule out semi-authoritarianism by design, it merely proves the 
point that the claim is too simplistic to provide a holistic political description of the 
current political deficit in the Ethiopian system. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
SEMI-AUTHORITARIANISM BY DESIGN OR DEFAULT:  
TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN 
 
 
 
The organization of democracy, the form in which people are enabled in any society to 
express their freedom, has to be in accordance with the people‟s culture, history and 
development. You can‟t have democracy like Coca-Cola. It‟s given, it‟s in a bottle and we 
all drink the same kind of Coca-Cola. What kind of democracy is that? 
 
~ Julius Nyerere ~ 
 
Introduction 
In his brilliant book, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation, Larry 
Diamond points out that, democratization in general, and in the third world in particular, 
is a little understood and complex concept. Academic observers cannot agree on the exact 
meaning of democracy, nor the number of current democracies, not to mention the 
conditions needed for democratic consolidation. He further argues that in their review, 
David Collier and Steven Levitky identify more than 550 subtypes to democracy 
accumulated in 150 different studies.235 The ambiguity with the democratic concept is 
associated with the introduction of democratic institutions into the political environment 
of countries such as Ethiopia, yet these institutions are subject to severe, authoritarian 
tendencies. To many academics, including Diamond, it is clear that the “third wave” of 
democratization was not going to be as smooth a process as initially projected. On the 
contrary, he points out that the 21
st
 century “could bring a third reverse wave”.236 
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Semi-authoritarianism as a theory is also a reaction to the fallacy of the 
democratic `transition paradigm‟.  Ottaway builds on Thomas Carothers criticism of the 
paradigm by coining the term semi-authoritarianism and distinguishing between design 
and default within the framework. Ottaway de-masks three core assumptions of the 
transition paradigm. First, she argues that the assumption that any country moving away 
from dictatorial rule is in transition towards democracy is flawed. The rejection of full 
dictatorial rule does not automatically mean that a country is on track to democratization. 
Second, she also rejects the argument that democracy unfolds in three stages – 
democratic opening, breakthrough and consolidation.  Instead, she argues that it is quite 
possible for a country to stay in a limbo state between democratic opening and 
breakthrough never reaching democratic consolidation. Third, Ottaway effectively 
demonstrates that while regular, relatively free and fair elections are important; relying on 
elections alone to determine democratic commitment can be misleading. 
Although Ottaway is on the right track, in her theory of semi-authoritarianism, she 
ignores two further core criticisms of the transition paradigm. When formulating her 
argument, and looking at country cases, Ottaway places the considerable weight on the 
leadership in power. At the same time she neglects to attribute full weight to underlying 
factors such as political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, socio-cultural 
traditions, development patterns and other structural features. Ottaway also ignores the 
limitations facing effective state building. When looking at the theory of semi-
authoritarianism it is clear that a political leadership can exploit some of the above 
mentioned elements. Indeed in the case of Ethiopia, the EPRDF has done so, but at the 
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same time, when it comes to democracy these same elements can be limiting and 
overwhelming for any governing authority. 
Elements such as the ethnic balancing game, for example, can be highly 
unpredictable, have and can lead to violence, and there is always a threat of „national‟ 
disintegration. Ethiopia is faced with serious state building, and state legitimacy 
challenges. These challenges take central stage in the country‟s political discourse from 
the local all the way to the national level. The theory of semi-authoritarianism ignores the 
relationship between the nature of regime changes, and the political patterns that shape 
and reshape the local political culture. Semi-authoritarianism by design is adept at 
analyzing the current leadership‟s commitment to the democratic process. However, it 
ignores the underlying structural and political factors that facilitate a significant 
propensity for authoritarianism. 
 
A Brief Overview 
To assess semi-authoritarianism by design in the case of Ethiopia, Ottaway‟s 
guidelines were applied to the literature. Focus was directed at the EPRDF‟s approach to 
the challenges of competitive politics and the limitations on power transfer and power 
sharing. Although the claim that the current EPRDF government is semi-authoritarian by 
design is very convincing, a lot of questions remain about how Ethiopia‟s past political 
history and structure have contributed to the current political condition. Just to reiterate 
some previous observations, by looking at the country‟s historic, political, and ethnic 
legacies, there were strong indications that such elements as political understanding at the 
ethnic level, dependency theory, Big Man politics, the zero-sum form of politics, as well 
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as the fragile relationship between instability and nation-building, can overwhelm any 
government.  
Ottaway‟s theory of semi-authoritarianism is one of many classifications of 
political systems. Most countries that made democratization commitments in the 1990s 
are faced with several complex and overlapping challenges. To some extent, both by 
design and default, these issues prevent democratization as well as obscure the 
possibilities of accurate democratic progress assessments. In the case of Ethiopia, for 
example, if current political trends are analyzed, the conclusion can be reached that the 
current government is semi-authoritarian by design. However, if one dedicates more 
research to an in depth historical analysis from a political perspective, it becomes clear 
that Ethiopia is semi-authoritarian by default. 
 This does not mean that Ottaway‟s theory is without relevance. However, the 
theory is broad enough that most current country examples in the third world can be 
projected on to it, and given the illusion that they fit the pattern. In reality, only analyzing 
current political trends in any country is like attempting to determine the shape of an 
iceberg by examining the one-tenth of its volume visible at the surface. Although an in- 
depth analysis of any country‟s social, cultural, political, ethnic and developmental past 
and present can be confusing and overwhelming, it is vitally necessary. For, as the tip of 
the iceberg cannot exist independently from the rest of its mass, current political trends 
are a result and reaction to the legacy of past ones. 
 Theoretical frameworks such as semi-authoritarianism are a step in the right 
direction at identifying some crucial elements of democratic deficits. Yet an 
oversimplified identification of a problem warrants a simple solution, which in turn leads 
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to more complications. Accordingly as the Ethiopian case study demonstrates, Ottaway‟s 
theory suffers from ambiguity. Once the concept of semi-authoritarianism by design is 
refuted by the possibility of default, the term loses a measure of its prescience. Whether 
one argues in favor of a half empty or half full glass, the main challenge of 
democratization remains. In the Ethiopian case, this challenge manifests in the clash of 
state building ideologies, ethnic aspirations, radically diverging views of democracy and 
democratization among different social structures and the challenges of 
underdevelopment and exclusion of key ethnic communities. 
 
Conclusion 
Clearly, democratization although not altogether unimportant, is not a priority in 
Ethiopia. It is secondary to the ethnic issue, to regional inequalities and poverty, to 
limited support and to common understanding of democratization. To come to terms, or 
at least superficially manage these issues, the constitution drafted by the EPRDF, along 
with fundamental subsequent policies, were rushed, untested, unclear and full of 
ambiguity. The new regime created the experiment in `ethnic federalism‟, which simply 
cultivated and heightened ethno-national awareness, grievances and resentments. Ethnic 
competition became institutionalized to the point that ethnic groups assess political and 
economic developments from a safety and group preservation perspective. Human rights 
and ethnic empowerment are determined by the incumbent regime.
237
 Those ethnic 
groups out of power and often targeted for repression quickly fear for their survival while 
ethnic power-holders may seek to use the state to eliminate the `ethnic other‟ or severely 
impair it. In other words, “ethno political conflicts within states, which can range from 
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sporadic incidents of interethnic violence to genocidal massacres, reveal the extent to 
which ethnic communities are capable of fiercely competing for power and political 
control because of the benefits and security political victory confers”.238 Thus, Ethiopia‟s 
spiral into the current form of semi-authoritarian governance, cloaked by democratic 
language and the existence of some democratic institutions with limited power, can be 
linked to an absent sense of belonging and a nonexistent moral bond within the 
community at the national level.  
The May 2010 national elections for The House of People‟s Representatives as 
well as Regional State Councils resulted in an overwhelming parliamentary majority for 
the EPRDF further re-enforcing the semi-authoritarian character of the government. 
Although the government claims, “the election was peaceful, credible, fair, free and 
democratic”,239 the opposition has rejected the results, but the Supreme Court refused a 
re-run.
240
 At the same time, Human Rights Watch claims that the election was 
“undetermined” by voter turnout leading to election,241 and point out that opposition 
leader Birtukan Mideksa has been incarcerated since December 29, 2008.
242
 The 
European Union Observation Mission to Ethiopia acknowledged that the elections were 
“peaceful, calm, with high voter turnout”243 but was critical of the uneven playing field 
pointing out that 50 per cent of campaign coverage was given to the ruling party in the 
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state-owned media and voiced concern over “weakened voters‟ ability to make an 
informed choice”.244 
The 2010 elections certainly saw an even further diminished and repressed 
opposition virtually disappear from the contest, and the EPRDF triumph suggests that 
semi-authoritarianism will continue to dominate in the Ethiopian framework. Thus, the 
main question is whether the Ethiopian state can prevent disintegration. As one Ethiopian 
put it, 
The problems that threaten our country are the cumulative result of years of terror, 
resentment, neglect, misplaced priorities, and bad leadership. The present leaders lack the 
wisdom, the credibility, and the legitimacy to bring the nation together. The crisis that 
Ethiopia faces calls for an understanding of the terrible consequences of the continual 
military confrontation between the regime and the opposition movements.
245
  
 
Hence, future research attention should be dedicated to the following questions: 
Is there a perpetual ambiguity between the concepts of nation building and legitimate 
governance? 
Can complex ethnic issues in Ethiopia ever yield a government that is viewed as 
legitimate by most ethnic groups? 
Are Ethiopian political challenges overwhelming enough to corrupt any government 
utilizing any governing ideology? 
Can damage done by short and long term restructuring policies adopted by the past three 
Ethiopian governing regimes be ameliorated or corrected? 
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APPENDIX I. 
 
Five Core Assumptions of the Transition Paradigm as Described by Thomas 
Carothers: 
 
1. Any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered in transition. 
2. Democracy unfolds in the following set stages: 
 Democratic opening 
 Democratic breakthrough 
 Democratic consolidation 
3. Elections receive determinative importance. In other words, regularly held 
elections are equated with democracy. 
4. Underlying factors such as, economic development, political history, institutional 
legacies, ethnic make-up, socio-cultural traditions, and other “structural” features 
will not be a major factor either at the onset or at the outcome of the transition 
process. 
5. Democratic transitions making up the „third wave‟ are being built on coherent 
functioning states. 
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APPENDIX II. 
 
Ethiopia Facts (Information retrieved from BBC – Ethiopia Country Profile  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072164.stm Retrieved on: April 13, 
2011 
 
 Full name: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia  
 Population: 84.9 million (UN, 2010)  
 Capital: Addis Ababa  
 Area: 1.13 million sq km (437,794 sq miles)  
 Major languages: Amharic, Oromo, Tigrinya, Somali  
 Major religions: Christianity, Islam  
 Life expectancy: 56 years (men), 59 years (women) (UN)  
 Monetary unit: 1 Birr = 100 cents  
 Main exports: Coffee, hides, oilseeds, beeswax, sugarcane  
 GNI per capita: US $330 (World Bank, 2009)  
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APPENDIX III. 
 
Ethiopian Political System and Election Results (Data procured from the African 
Elections Database http://africanelections.tripod.com) 
 
 Current President of Ethiopia: Girma Wolde-Giorgis (Since 08 October 2001; 
elected 2001, re-elected 2007). The President is elected by the House of People‟s 
Representatives for a 6-year term. 
 Prime Minister: Meles Zenawi (TPLF) (EPRDF) (Since 22 August 
1995; designated interim president in 1991 following ouster of previous regime, 
elected 1995, re-elected 2000 and 2005) The Prime minister is designated by the 
party in power following legislative elections. 
 Federal Parliamentary Assembly is bicameral 
 House of Federation is composed of 108 seats. Members are chosen by 
regional state councils to serve 5-year terms. 
 House of People‟s Representatives is composed of 547 seats. Members are 
elected by direct popular vote in single-member constituencies using 
the first-past-the-post (simple majority) system; members serve 5-year 
terms. 
 Political Situation since 1889 
 1889-1931 Absolute Monarchy 
 1931-1936 Traditional Monarchy (In practice, still an absolute monarchy) 
 1936-1941 Italian Occupation 
 1941-1955 Traditional Monarchy (In practice, still an absolute monarchy) 
 1955-1974 Traditional Monarchy 
 1974-1984 Military Regime 
 1984-1987 Military Regime and De-Facto One Party State under the WPE 
 1987-1991 One Party State under the WPE  
 1991-1995 Transitional Government/Multiparty Transition 
 1995- Present, Theoretically an Emerging Democracy under the EPRDF 
 Next Scheduled Presidential Election: 2013 
 Next Scheduled House of Federation Election: 2010 
 Next Scheduled House of People’s Representatives Election: 2010 
 Political Parties:  
 AAPO - All Amhara People‟s Organization  
 AEUP - All Ethiopia Unity Party 
 ANDM - Amhara National Democratic Movement 
 ANDO - Argoba National Democratic Organization 
 ANDP - Afar National Democratic Party 
 BGPDUF - Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Front 
 EDL - Ethiopian Democratic League 
 EDUP - Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party 
 ESFDP - Ethiopian Social Democratic Federal Party 
 GPDM - Gambela People's Democratic Movement 
 HNL - Harari National League 
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 OFDM - Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement 
 ONC - Oromo National Congress 
 OPDO - Oromo People‟s Democratic Organization 
 RE: MDSJ - Rainbow Ethiopia: Movement for Democracy and Social 
Justice  
 SEPDC - Southern Ethiopia People‟s Democratic Coalition 
 SEPDM - South Ethiopia People‟s Democratic Movement 
 SMPDUO - Sheko and Mezenger People‟s Democratic Unity 
Organization 
 SPDP - Somali People‟s Democratic Party 
 TPLF - Tigray People‟s Liberation Front 
 UEDP-Medhin - United Ethiopia Democratic Party-Medhin 
 WPE - Worker‟s Party of Ethiopia 
 Coalitions:  
 Coalition for Unity and Democracy Contested the 2005 House of People‟s 
Representatives Election. Member parties include the All Ethiopia Unity 
Party (AEUP), Ethiopian Democratic League (EDL), Rainbow Ethiopia: 
Movement for Democracy and Social Justice (RE: MDSJ), and the United 
Ethiopia Democratic Party-Medhin (UEDP-Medhin). 
 Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) Contested 
the 1994 Constituent Assembly Election and House of People‟s 
Representatives Elections held in 1995, 2000, and 2005. Member parties 
include the Tigray People‟s Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara National 
Democratic Movement (ANDM), South Ethiopia People‟s Democratic 
Movement (SEPDM), and the Oromo People‟s Democratic Organization 
(OPDO). 
 United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) Contested the 2005 House 
of People‟s Representatives Election. Member parties include the All 
Amhara People‟s Organization (AAPO), Ethiopian Democratic Unity 
Party (EDUP), Ethiopian Social Democratic Federal Party (ESDFP), 
Oromo National Congress (ONC), and the Southern Ethiopia People‟s 
Democratic Coalition (SEPDC). 
 
05 June 1994 Constituent Assembly Elections (Election was boycotted by several 
opposition political parties) 
 
 Registered Voters: Data unavailable 
 Voter Turnout: Data unavailable 
 
Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)                            484 Seats 
Others                                                                                                                       63 Seats 
Total                                                                                                                       547 Seats 
 
07 May, 18 and 28 June 1995 House of People’s Representatives Elections (Election 
was boycotted by many opposition groups, including the Oromo Liberation Front) 
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 Registered Voters: 21,337,379 
 Voter Turnout: 20,068,508 (94.1%) 
 
Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)                            483 Seats 
Independents                                                                                                               8 Seats 
Others                                                                                                                       46 Seats 
Unconfirmed                                                                                                             11 Seats 
Total                                                                                                                       548 Seats 
 
14 May/31 August 2000 House of People’s Representatives Elections (In the Somali 
Region, elections were held on 31 August 2000) 
 
 Registered Voters: 21,834,806 
 Voter Turnout: 19,607,841 (89.8%) 
 
Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)                            481 Seats 
 Oromo Peoples‟ Democratic Organization (OPDO) 183 
 Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) 146 
 Southern Ethiopia People‟s Democratic Movement (SEPDM)  112 
 Tigray People‟s Liberation Front  40 
EPRDF – Afiliated Parties                                                                                        37 Seats 
Others                                                                                                                       16 Seats 
Independents                                                                                                             13 Seats 
Total                                                                                                                       547 Seats 
 
15 May/21 August 2005 House of People’s Representatives Election 
 
 Registered Voters: 25,605,851 (Registered voter figures exclude the Somali 
Region. Voter registration in that region took place in July 2005, but figures are 
not available. Elections were conducted in the Somali Region on 21 August 
2005.) 
 Voter Turnout: Data Unavailable 
 
Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)                            327 Seats 
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)                                                           109 Seats 
United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF)                                                         52 Seats 
Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM)                                                 11 Seats 
Benishangul-Gumuz People‟s Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF)                         8 Seats 
Gambella People‟s Democratic Movement (GPDM)                                                 3 Seats 
Sheko and Mezenger People‟s Democratic Unity Organization (SMPDUO)             1 Seat 
Somali People‟s Democratic Party (SPDP)                                                              23 Seats 
Argoba National Democratic Organization (ANDO)                                                  1 Seat 
Independent                                                                                                                  1 Seat 
Vacant                                                                                                                         2 Seats  
Total                                                                                                                       547 Seats 
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APPENDIX IV. 
 
Official Results of the 23
rd
 May 2010 General Election Results based on the data released 
by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NRBE). Data was released on June 21, 
2010. 
 
The House of People’s Representatives (HPR) 
 
The Ethiopian Peoples‟ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)                     499 Seats 
The Somali Peoples‟ Democratic Party (SPDP)                                                      24 Seats 
The Benishangul Gumuz Peoples Democratic Party (BGPDP)                                 9 Seats 
The Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP)                                                           8 Seats 
The Gambela People‟s Unity Democratic Movement (GPUDM)                             3 Seats 
The Harari National League (HNL)                                                                           1 Seat 
The Argoba People Democratic Organization (APDO)                                             1 Seat 
The Ethiopian Federal Democratic Organization (APDO)                                        1 Seat 
The Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (Medrek)                                       1 Seat 
Independent                                                                                                                1 Seat 
Total Number of seats in the House of People’s Representatives                       547 Seats 
 
The Regional State Councils (RSC) 
 
Tigray  The Tigray‟s Liberation Front (TPLF-EPRDF)                             152 Seats 
 
Afar  The Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP)                                 93 Seats 
  The Argoba People‟s Democratic Organization (APDO)                  3 Seats 
 
Amhara The Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM-EPRDF)  294 Seats 
 
Oromia The Oromo People‟s Democratic Organization (OPDO-EPRDF) 537 Seats 
 
Somali The Somali People‟s Democratic Party (SPDP)                            186 Seats 
 
Benishangul The Benishangul Gumuz Peoples Democratic Party (BGPDP)       98 Seats 
Gumuz  The All Ethiopian Unity Organization (AEUO)                     1 Seat 
 
SNNP  The Southern Ethiopian Peoples‟ Democratic Movement (GPUDM) 156     
Seats 
 
Gambella The Gambella People‟s Unity Democratic Movement (GPUDM)   156 
Seats 
 
Hareri  The Oromo People‟s Democratic Organization (OPDO-EPRDF)   18 Seats 
  The Harari National League (HNL) 18 Seats 
 
Total number of seats in 9 Regional Stats                                                         1,904 Seats 
  94  
APPENDIX V. 
 
Ethiopia Freedom House Rating (data retrieved from Freedom House Organization 
http://www.freedomhouse.org) 
 
Ethiopia‟s 2010 Freedom Status: Partly Free 
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APENDIX VI. 
 
Map of Ethiopian Expansionism  
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APENDIX VII. 
 
Map of Ethiopian Federalism (map retrieved from Abbay Media – „The Ethiopian 
Information Bank‟ http://abbaymedia.com) 
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APENDIX VIII. 
 
Organizational Structure of the Five Levels of Government of The Federal 
Democratic of Ethiopia (Flow Chart recreated based on Azeze, Fecade‟s model in 
Ethiopia: The Challenge of Democracy from Bellow) 
 
  
